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DEATH OF CONFLICTS
MARY JANE MORRISONt

T

HIS ARTICLE is about choice of law. It is about making

choices of law fit the policies of the underlying substantive law
and about why that fit is important both to the choice of law and to
the substantive law.
Courts all across this country still are in Prosser's quagmire' of
choice of law. They are so busy counting up contacts or weighing out
relations that they have lost sight of the substantive law itself and the
policies that give the law form. They bog down in a welter of details
and, from the perspective of their own related non-conflicts cases,
often reach the incorrect result. They thus lose the chance to achieve
clarity not only in choice of law but also in the analysis and theory of
substantive law.
Courts continue to sink beneath the dismal waters of the conflicts
quagmire, but there is a lifeline: Keep choice of law consonant with
the policies of the underlying substantive law. 2 Courts that grab this
lifeline soon will see that those policies and laws usually contain no
geographic strings and that choice of law decisions may be cut loose
from the illicit geographic focus of the old and new choice of law
theories. Having cut conflicts loose from geography, the courts will
not be lost in a swamp with no reasoned way to resolve conflicts; for
there remains the substantive law itself and its informing and enforming policies, in which the conflict has arisen in the first place and
through which the road to terrafirma lies. By traveling that road, the
t Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. B.A., University of Florida, 1965; A.M., University of Illinois, 1971; J.D., College of William and
Mary, 1981; Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1981.
1. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). Dean Prosser

noted that "[tihe realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible language." Id.
2. Some commentators have flatly rejected any notion of conflict of laws based
on substantive law policies. See,e.g., E. ScOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 2.12
n.4 (1982).

(313)
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courts not only will resolve the conflicts but also will discover newlyshaped substantive law continents.
The best way to examine a problem is to inspect it at close
quarters. This is especially true in choice of law analysis. Because
choice of law doctrines traditionally have been made to encompass
distinct areas of substantive law, we should expect analyses of choice
of law decisions to focus on how a particular court deals with the
breadth of substantive conflicts. Paradoxically, the traditional mode
of analysis is to skip all over the map to discuss a multiplicity of
courts' tort conflicts decisions, for example, without any reference to
other areas of substantive law conflicts. Rarely have scholars critically analyzed all of one court's conflicts decisions directly. Even
more problematically, the traditional mode of analysis for choice of
law has been to concentrate on only choice of law-rules for making
choices, factors to consider, results other courts reach-instead of connecting a court's choice of law decisions with its non-conflicts decisions in the related substantive law.
That concentration has led our courts astray, for it leads courts
to believe they are doing something intrinsically distinct in resolving
conflicts in the choice of law context. They are not. The fundamental problem in choice of law is the same as the one in developing
common law: to shape the law to conform to substantive policies and
thereby smooth out the bristling edges of the law.
In this article I analyze a variety of choice of law decisions of one
court and connect those decisions with the court's related non-conflicts decisions. I use the cases of the Minnesota Supreme Court because of its recent flurry of choice of law decisions and the critical
scholarly discussion of the court's unique approach. Further, this
court is an ordinary court. There is no Cardozo, Lehman, or Andrews on this bench. Yet this ordinary court is doing a yeoman's job
of work in choice of law in which it has shown signs of both breakthrough and breakdown in its use of "choice-influencing-considera3
tions" methodology.
The choice-influencing-considerations methodology has been described as dangerous, 4 and so it is, for it easily encourages intellectual
carelessness and unsophisticated bumbling. But it also is beautifully
dangerous and, like all beautiful and volatile concepts, contains both
the seeds of its own destruction and the germs for the next stage.
3. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW 195 (3d ed. 1977); Leflar,
Con~d'cts Law. More on Choice Inftuencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
4. See Neuhaus, Legal Certainhy Versus Equity in Confltct of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 795, 802 (1963).
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That stage is the death of choice of law and its replacement with
clear, hardheaded, thorough substantive law analysis and theory.
The reward for engaging head on the substantive law and its underlying policies in the choice of law determination-despite consequent
difficulties and complexities-will be an increasingly fruitful national
debate about substantive law. Courts would soon discover that for
much of the substantive law of tort or contract or estates there may be
universal policies running the breadth of this country, instead of stopping at borders which only geographers and police officers recognize.
.Moreover, courts and lawyers and the people might feel at ease with
differences among very well developed and articulate views about
substantive law. Each of these possibilities means the death of conflicts because there will be no conflict between just decisions, and just
decisions are ones grounded in coherent, even if different, policies that
run beyond the confines of the individual decision or type of decision.
I.

A

GENERAL CRITIQUE OF CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES

The aim of choice of law is to effectuate the policies of the underlying substantive law. 5 The reason there are choice of law problems is

that there are conflicting substantive laws. The importance of this
conflict does not lie in the existence of more than one substantive law
with regard to one particular area, for example, automobile accidents. If that were the whole of the conflicts problem, the problem
would be one of form, not one of substance. Rather, the importance
of the conflict of substantive laws is in the conflict of the policies un6
derlying the conflicting laws.
If there were only one law of tort, or if tort law and contract law
were entirely distinct, there would be no conflicts among laws of tort,
or between tort and contract; and there would be no related choice of
law problems for courts to resolve. In fact, however, some laws allow
guests to recover from hosts for ordinary negligence in driving
automobiles, and other laws allow the guest to recover only for gross
negligence. 7 The effect of the requirement of gross negligence is to
prevent recoveries otherwise available under ordinary negligence law;
its purpose is to prevent these recoveries by providing the host with a
shield from ordinary negligence liability." The purpose of the ordi5. For the fainthearted, the "is" is prescriptive.
6. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 2, § 2.6 at 17-18; R. WEINBTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.3 (2d ed. 1980).
7. As of Oct. 1, 1979, eight geographically scattered states retained traditional

guest statutes requiring gross negligence of recklessness on the part of the host. See R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 6.9.
8. More specifically, the rule might further two policies: protecting the host
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nary negligence law is to provide compensation to the tort victim. 9
When a court could apply either of these two laws to a lawsuit, the
court faces a choice of law problem' 0 in which one choice will give
effect to the policies underlying one substantive law, and the other
choice will give effect to different policies underlying another substantive law. The court cannot escape giving effect to underlying substantive law policies. The only question is, to which of the conflicting
policies should the court give effect?
There used to be, and in some jurisdictions still are, strict rules
for choice of law. These rules, known as lex loci rules, told courts
which of two substantive laws to choose solely on the basis of the
location of the events giving rise to the litigation." Courts began to
chafe under the yoke of these rules and frequently sought to avoid
giving effect to the policies of the underlying substantive law to which
from the "ingratitude" of the guest and preventing the instigation of collusive suits
against the host's insurer. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1974).
9. See id. § 1. Prosser's view is that the law of negligence serves to allocate the
losses arising from human activity, but no doubt, it also provides an element of admonition to the wrongdoer. Id. § 5. Some courts agree with Prosser. See, e.g.,
Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1978) (tort law mixes compensation and deterrence in its ordinary damages); Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2669 (1983) (implying an exception to worker's compensation statute, which is "no fault" and "exclusive" remedy, to allow tort action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for wrongful discharge in order to further
deterrent function of tort law).
Whether today there are punishment and deterrence goals in tort causes of action for damages ought to be seriously questioned. The intentional torts and libel are
among the best candidates for proving there are such tort goals. Historically, these
torts have not required the plaintiff to prove actual damages as an element of the
cause of action. Thus, the plaintiff did not have to prove the defendant was at fault,
which (paradoxically) has suggested these tort actions further punishment and deterrence goals. One should compare negligence suits, in which the actual damage requirement clearly functions to say that a plaintiff who cannot show he needs to be
compensated has no cause of action. With the constitutional changes in libel (at least
as against the media) to require a minimum of a fault basis for the action and the
increasing authority for requiring a showing of actual damage in, for example, "unintentional" trespass, there have been serious inroads on the putative punishment and
deterrence goals in tort damages actions. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 347-45 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35(2), comment h
(1965).
10. Thoughout this article, for purposes of discussion, I assume that the forum
has jurisdiction over the parties and that there is a "true" conflict in the limited sense
that more than one law may constitutionally be applied, one of which, generally
speaking, will be the forum law.
11. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). The
territorial rules of the First Restatement are descendents of the theories James Kent
and Joseph Story developed in the early nineteenth century and of the vested rights
approach of Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement. See J. H. BEALE,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWs (1935); J. KENT, 4 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
(1836); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC (1834).
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the rules pointed through rule manipulation. In the lex loci system,
courts could manipulate the rules, for example, by characterizing a
lawsuit as being one in contract rather than tort so that the rules
might point to the law of a different jurisdiction. 12 Additionally,
courts could "relocate" the place of the tortious wrong.' 3 In either
case, courts attempted to manipulate the strict rules to resolve a
choice of law problem through the application of the substantive policies of the law.
Scholars, who always have played an active role in choice of law,
began to point out that the lex loci rules lacked soundness because the
rules focused on fortuitous factors such as place rather than on the
policies underlying the substantive laws. They urged courts to substitute analysis for rules.' 4 Predictably, the scholars did not speak with
12. Courts have vast experience in rule manipulation; they engage in it at the
slightest opening wedge between rule and policy. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels U-Drive
Auto Renting Co., 188 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). See generally, W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 440-49 (7th ed. 1982).
13. Compare Sestito v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961) (place of the wrong for
loss of consortium is place of physical injury, not of marital domicile) with Haum-

schild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (governing
place is one of marital domicile, not place of physical injury).
14. See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of
the Apphcable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1952); Cook, The Loglcal and Legal Bases of
the Contfl't of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924).

Leflar has stated that "in the minds of all the commentators there has always
been a continuing urge to focus on the true reasons that underlie choice-of-law adjudications, the basic choice-influencing considerations that actually lead, or should
lead, the courts to one result or another in particular types of cases." Leflar, Conylcts
Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1585 (1966).
Urging the courts to analyze the choice of law issues rather than simply apply
territorial rules should not suggest to anyone that analysis is something new. The
functional equivalent of analysis of some substantive law policies and of government
interests, for example, were built into lex loci rules. The analysis was not perfect, and
the rules reflected that imperfection. Thus, the analysis of governmental interests
built into the tort lex loci rule was that the forum of the tort has interests in, for
example, its highways and its courts that are reflected in the forum's attitude about,
say, guest statutes and that these forum policies should be furthered for forum torts.
The analysis of the policies of substantive law built into the contract lex loci rule was
that parties are reasonably free to contract and should have their intentions enforced
and that where the parties contracted is evidence of these intentions.
The lex loci rules, then, were not ex nihilo. Athena may have sprung full-grown
from the brow of Zeus; not so with rules of law. They spring from policy. The lex loci
rules sprang from policy grounded in a particular analytic theory. Contemporary
analytic theories originally differ from the old rules on what the appropriate analyses

are, when to do those analyses, and whether to continue to analyze. Insofar as the
old rules were based on appropriate analysis, there never has been any reason to
abandon the rules. There is reason to examine that analytic basis, however, because
some of the old rules have proved to be infected with poor or out-of-step analysis.
This is a very different problem than the problem that reasonably, but incorrectly,
might be thought to exist by the suggestion that courts substitute analysis for rules.
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one voice.' 5 There has been a plethora of theories about what courts
should analyze and how. Courts have not been sure which theory to
follow; moreover, none of these theories is easy to use. One theory
identifies seventeen policies for courts to consider in choosing among
conflicting laws; 16 another, nine;' 7 still another, five. 18 A different set
of theories emphasizes the competing governmental interests in the
underlying substantive laws, 1 9 interests that have proved difficult to
analyze. Further, the multiple theories of choice of law also have
proved to be subject to manipulation, albeit of a more sophisticated
20
kind than was true of the lexi loci manipulation.
Analyzing the policies of a particular substantive law or of a

whole area of substantive law is not easy. Nor will analyzed policy
standing alone always point to only one of several laws. For example,

the policies underlying the defense of contributory negligence and
those underlying the lack of that defense may seem to be the same: to
deter accidents. However, this ambiguity shows that either the poli-

cies underlying such conflicting laws have not been fully articulated,
or one of the laws does not fit the policies. It also shows that articulating and analyzing policies is hard work. And it may be work that is
not sufficient to resolve the choice of law problem. Thus, for example, if two laws set near, but different, ceilings on tort liability, either
15. Perhaps the most influential early theories were the governmental interests
theory of Professor Currie and the lexfori theory of Professor Ehrenzweig. See generally
B. CURRIE, supra note 14; Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basz'cRules in the Con 'ct ofLaws,
58 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1960); Ehrenzweig, A ProperLaw n a ProperForum.- A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965). For sketches of the
views of Currie and Ehrenzweig, the "functional analysis" theories of von Mehren,
Trautman, and Weintraub, and the "value-oriented" theories of Leflar and Cavers,
see E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 2, §§ 2.6-.17.
16. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721
(1957).
17. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 14.
18. R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 195. Leflar's approach is called the "choiceinfluencing-considerations methodology." It requires examination of five factors:
(1) predictability of results, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order,
(3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental
interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law. Id. The considerations have
no fixed priority: "Their relative importance varies according to the area of law involved." Id.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1971) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN,
THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); B. CURRIE, supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). In applying
the "most significant relationship" test of the Second Restatement, the court noted
that "where it is difficult to determine what state has the most significant relationship, the trial court should continue to apply the substantive law of the place of the
tort." Id. at 474. See also Frummer v. Hilton Hotel Int'l, 60 Misc. 2d 840, 304
N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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the court must turn to some principle of resolution other than its standard tort policy analysis, or the court must apply the ceiling in its
jurisdiction as the ultimately controlling policy of its legislature. If
the court is in a disinterested jurisdiction Z, and the ceiling statutes
are from jurisdictions X and Y, clearly the court needs some principle
of resolution other than a tort compensation policy that each of the
three jurisdictions share. Noticing that, however, is just to notice that
even policy reasoning gives out at some point. In general, substantive
policy conflict is at the heart of choice of law and, consequently,
where we must focus our attention. Then, the rules and methods for
choosing among conflicting laws will result in choices that effectuate
the policies underlying those substantive laws.
Some of the contemporary analytic approaches appear to give
up any hope of a court's ever again being in a rule-applying position.
These analytic approaches seem to be geared only to case-by-case adjudication. 2 1 Other analytic approaches, however, always were bottomed on the expectation that choice of law analysis, over time and
through use, would lead a court into a position eventually of being
able to lay down rules for choice of law and that these new rules
would be better than the old ones of the lex loci approach. 22 What the
scholars forgot to tell courts was how to tell when the court is ready to
lay down a new rule.
Because courts prefer not to do case-by-case adjudication, a few
courts have refused to retreat from the lex loci rules into the plethora
of non-rule analytic methods. 23 Other courts have retreated into a
new lexfori rule. 24 The lexfori courts have seen that most of the analytic methods lead naturally to forum law anyway;2 5 these courts prefer to have a clear rule, even if the rule is defeasible in certain
circumstances. Still other courts have proceeded with one of the analytic methods. These methods require the court to analyze at least
21. See, e.g., Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovidedfor Case. Reections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 131 (1973) ("courts should decide

conflicts problems on a case by case basis with reference to considerations of policy
and fairness to the parties").
22. See, e.g., Cheatham & Reese, supra note 14, at 960.

23. See, e.g., McMillan v. McMilllan, 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). The lexfori rule,
developed by Ehrenzweig, holds as a basic principle that the application of foreign
law "must be analytically understood as an exception from the basic rule calling for
the application of the [law of the forum]." A. EHRENZWIEG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 104 (1962). According to Ehrenzweig, when the forum is sufficiently connected to
the litigation, the application of forum law has, from the point of view of the defendant, "reasonable forseeability and calculability." Id. § 266. The notion derives from
the procedural and jurisdictional doctrine offorum non convemens. Id. § 25.
25. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
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the forum's governmental interest in applying the forum law.2 6 Some
of these methods also require the court to analyze each of the conflicting laws to determine which of the laws is better or which law more
27
nearly works justice in the individual case.
Courts have made some headway in handling each of these analytical stages. Courts know, for example, that the governmental interest factors include considerations of whether there is a scheme into
which the particular law at issue fits, whether the legislature recently
has adopted the law, and the different purposes to be served by the
law. But in the complex process of weighing various factors and analyzing conflicting laws, courts all too easily lose sight of what should
be the ultimate aim of choice of law theories: to assure that the
choices among conflicting laws are consonant with the purposes and
policies of the underlying substantive contexts in which the choices
arise. 28 Thus, for example, underlying the abandonment of the tort
lex loci rule is a basic recognition that the location of an injury has
little to do with the substantive law of tort. 29 A choice among competing tort laws that turns on the fortuitous factor of where the tort
occurred all too easily severs the law of the case from the law of the
kind of case; that is, it severs the tort choice of law cases from tort law.
If, on the other hand, the choice among competing tort laws turns on
the substantive law of tort, that choice makes the tort choice of law
26. Most methods scholars use do require some analysis of the governmental
interests intended to be served by the application of a particular law. This interest
analysis derives from the ground-breaking work of Brainard Currie who asserted that
the central question in conflicts of law is whether it is reasonable for a state to assert
an interest in the application of a particular law and its underlying policies. Currie,
Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 177. Currie,

however, argued it would be inappropriate for a court to evaluate and weigh competing policies when the application of either of two competing laws was reasonable, and
thus in the case of a "true conflict", forum law should be applied. Currie, Comments
on Babcock v. Johnson-A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1233, 1243 (1963).
Other scholars have suggested that courts must accept the challenge of weighing
competing policies and interests where a true conflict exists. See, e.g., A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76 (1965).
27. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 14, at 980-81; R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at
212-15; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 328-29.
28. Section 6 of the Second Restatement, for example, lists as one of seven relevant "factors" to be applied in a choice of law determination, "the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 19, § 6.
However, the six other factors substantially diffuse this inquiry. Moreover, the Second Restatement's focus on "contacts" and the place of the "most significant relationships" and its use of presumptions based upon the lex loci rules of the First
Restatement limit the significance of modern judicial analysis. See id. §§ 145-146,
175, 188.
29. See Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279
(1963).
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cases fit with similar tort cases in which there are no choice of law
questions.
Many of the contemporary analytic methods for choice of law do
attempt, if not consciously or completely, to reach this kind of consistency by requiring that the court identify and choose in accordance
with interests and policies bound up with the underlying substantive
context in which conflict occurs. These methods thus could require
the court to choose among conflicting tort laws on substantive tort
doctrine grounds. A full recognition of the need for this consistency
could act both as the outside constraint on the choice in the particular case and as the basis of an eventual rule for choice of law in cases
of this kind. Once the court had made enough analytic choices
among, for example, tort laws, the court should have a sufficiently
clear understanding of the substantive tort policies of at least its own
jurisdiction to be able to lay down a tort choice of law rule. If over a
series of cases, a court came to see that the basic philosoply of forum
tort law is to compensate tort victims as fully as possible, the court
could say the rule for tort choice of law is, "Choose the tort law that
leads to fullest compensation." The problem with most of the existing analytic methods is their reliance on so many factors or analytical elements that courts tend too easily to treat what should be the
30
central and controlling factor as just one among many.
Perhaps any of the contemporary analytic methods for choice of
law could lead to choice of law rules that reflect the policies of the
underlying substantive law. But of all of these methods, the ones that
are most promising in this sense are those that include not only analyses of the policies or interests of the competing jurisdictions in their
conflicting substantive laws, but also an analysis of which of these
laws is better or more just. 3 1 This latter analysis provides the court
with an opportunity to keep its forum substantive law consonant with
its choice of law decisions. In the typical case, the problem is to keep
the choice consonant with the substantive law; occasionally, however,
the problem is to keep the substantive law consonant with the choice
the court is making. A "better law" analysis, more clearly than any
other, allows the court to make these "reverse fit" adjustments.
Forced to do more thinking about the substantive law in a choice of
30. See, e.g., Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1586-87 (1966). Leflar's considerations may often be contradic-

tory, and Leflar offers no directions for weighing the individual considerations. For a
list of the considerations, see note 18 supra.
31. This "better law" analysis has been most clearly articulated by Leflar but

also forms a part of the functional approach of von Mehren and Trautman and of
Weintraub's analysis. See F. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 2, § 2.11.
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law context than often is required in a substantive law context, the
"better law" court may well discover a need to adjust its own substantive law through analyzing choices among laws, and it will be able to
use that discovery later in its purely local adjudications.
Of course, a choice of law method that requires the court to analyze governmental interests of competing jurisdictions also affords an
opportunity for thorough analysis of substantive policy and the concurrent opportunity to adjust forum substantive law. However, the
rejection of forum law on the ground that nonforum law is better or
more just more clearly presages a shift in forum substantive law.
Such a choice of law result allows the court to announce that it intends to change forum substantive law in the future or that it desires
32
its legislature to make such a change soon.
This "reverse fit" potential in choice of law raises a nagging
doubt underlying all choice of law methodologies: There is something peculiar and unseemly about a court's refusal to abide by and
further its own substantive law policies and the policies of its own
legislature. Yet courts following the lex loci rules regularly have made
decisions amounting to such refusals. Indeed, any court makes such a
refusal when, under any choice of law method, it applies the law of
some jurisdiction other than its own, when its own law is one of the
competing potential choices.
Perhaps we might expect that a court therefore would follow its
own decisional law and the law of its own legislature anytime the
forum's law is one of the competing potential choices, on the ground
that we expect courts to further the policies of these laws. 33 To this

extent, a lexfori rule would make sense. Such a rule automatically
keeps the choices in particular cases consonant with the policies em32. Currie has questioned the propriety of this as a half-measure: "[Wihen
[courts] are convinced that a domestic law is archaic and unjust, they should abrogate it entirely, instead of utilizing the looseness of the system of conflict of laws as an
excuse for limited abrogation .... ." B. CURRIE, supra note 14, at 154 n.82. The
more radical but honest approach, which Currie thus urges, would be to immediately
declare a change in forum substantive law concurrently with the choice of law determination.
The problem with Currie's suggestion is that all too frequently the "archaic"
domestic law has become statutory and the only way a court can "abrogate" it is to
invalidate it on, for example, equal protection grounds. Professor Calabresi has argued that excessive uses of such methods of overturning statutes weakens the constitutional principles. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
33. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 24, § 104. Sedler has stated that
"[w]henever a court has been faced with a true conflict [in the tort context] it has
almost invariably-unless it continues to apply the place of the wrong rule-ended
up applying its own law." Sedler, Weinbiraub's Commentary on the Conftct of Laws.- The
Chapter on Torts, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1229, 1234 (1972).
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bodied in the laws of the forum, and this lexfori' rule avoids the unseemly potential present in other approaches for frustrating forum
policies and interests. However, the lexfor" rule also allows the courts
to avoid making an intellectually demanding inquiry into those policies and interests. The lexfori court has to make no more searching
examination of the substantive law than it makes in the purely local
case. The lexfori rule avoids the basic infelicity of the lex loci rulesthe frustration of forum policy; and yet has the added advantages of
the territorial rules-ease of application and predictability. What it
will not provide is any added examination of the substantive law.
A lexfori rule requires, however, a clarity about what we mean
by "the law of the forum." Do we mean the statutory law, or do we
mean the common law, or do we mean both? When there is an internal conflict in "the law of the forum," which lex of the lexforum is the
one the court should apply? Should the court choose its legislature's
law and policies, or should the court choose its own view of the law
and its own policies?
These are hard questions, and they go to the heart of serious jurisprudential issues that are far wider than the choice of law context
in which they occur here. Who is in charge of saying what the law
is-the legislature or the court? Who is in charge of saying what the
policies of the law are or what the governmental interests are in particular laws? Contemporary approaches to choice of law can throw
these hard questions into high relief, irrespective of which approach
the court follows. When a Virginia court insists on following the
court's territorial rules, its decisions can fly in the face of the policies of
the Virginia legislature. The same is true when a forum court decides
to apply a nonforum law because the nonforum's governmental interests outweigh those of the forum or because the nonforum's "relationship" to the litigation is "more significant" than is the forum's.
Similarly, when a Minnesota court insists on following a "better law"
theory for choice of law and insists on being the final arbiter of where
the governmental interests of Minnesota lie, the court's decisions can
seem to be lawless insofar as the court rejects a Minnesota statute in
favor of an Iowa statute.
There is a saving grace in this last example, however. A "betterlaw court" that retains control of determining not only which law is
better but also where forum governmental interests lie retains control
of the substantive law. That court then is a common law court in a
traditional sense and can keep the law in tune with the changing
scene in ways that the more deferential lexfor" court is unlikely to be
able to do.
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This potential for common law development may make more
sense in tort cases than, for example, in trusts and estates, since the
sovereign has a traditional role in estate law, and the court has a
traditional original role in tort law. 34 This difference in potential for
common law control may be a sign, not that something has gone awry
in the tort choice of law case, but that a strong-willed "better law"
method is inappropriate in estates choice of law cases. Consequently,
courts may need more than one method for determining choice of law
issues.
Indeed, the suggestion that there could be one all-encompassing
analytic method for choice of law is astonishing. If the outside constraint on choice of law methods is that the choices must be consonant
with the underlying substantive law policies, and if there are different
kinds of substantive law with different kinds of policies, then we need
difrent kinds of analyt' methods for these different kinds of choice of law
contexts. Yet all of the contemporary analytic methods implicitly
suggest that we need only one method as long as this one method
allows for differing uses.
For example, although the better law methodology is highly sophisticated in that it calls for different sorts of analyses, varying according to the underlying substantive law, not every choice of law
issue should turn on one law's being "better" than another. There
35
Of
still is room for a lex loci rule in some estates choice of law issues.
course, the lex loci*rule in this context easily could be made to fit the
"better law" construct. It could be said to be better in the sense that
it is the forum's rule governing the disposition of property located
within the forum. Making "better law" the governing consideration
would yield a unitag'theory, there being no other discriminable parts.
However, this unity would smack ofapriorism. It would lead to glossing a choice as a choice of "better law" for no reason other than the
fact of the choice-certainly not an advance in choice of law.
Rather, when there are two or more possible foci, recognizing the
existence of all is better than striving for an arbitrary unity.
Leflar understands the multiplefoci problem. Rather than assigning fixed priorities among the five choice-influencing considerations, he allows the priorities to vary with the substantive context in
which the choice of law issue arises. 36 The point is that there may be
34. See G.B. BOGART & G.T. BOGART, LAW OF TRUSTS § 7 (5th ed. 1973) (recognizing the vast predominance of statutory authority in estates law).
35. Bui see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 8.6 (asserting that a selection between
two conflicting rules of estates law should turn on the policies and interests of the
competing states where the conflict is "real").
36. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, § 106, at 245. The choice-influencing-consider-
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at least one kind of case in which the traditional lex loci rule should
provide the rule, and it should be denominated as such. There is no
advantage in applying one methodology for the sake of a unitary approach when another would reach the same result and for the same
underlying reasons.

As Professor Leflar points out, there currently is judicial eclecti'37
cism in choice of law that is leading to "'the' modern approach.
This eclecticism combines several of the contemporary analytic methodologies and
cit[es] all the authors, along with current articles that discuss the court's specific problem, plus a selection of recent
judicial opinions which, regardless of reasoning, have broken away from old-time mechanical choice-of-law rules.
Such a collection of authority will almost surely support any
sensible non-mechanical choice of law that an intelligent
38
and conscientious court is likely to arrive at.

But this sort of judicial eclecticism is not sufficiently eclectic.
The problem with the territorial rules was not that they were territorial, but that some of them were senseless in that geography had no
connection with substantive law. The solution does not necessarily lie
in rejecting all the old rules in favor of multi-value or multi-factor
analyses, no matter how complex and many-colored these analyses
might be. But, a court adopting a territorial approach must give a
reasoned analysis of the connection between the underlying substantive law and geography. The point is that the substantive policies of
the law must dictate the choice of law methodology in the particular
case; a methodology that turns on geography will be the appropriate
ations methodology has essentially an ad hoc unitary form. Such a form can be created for any theory simply by stating the several propositions as disjuncts or
conjuncts so as to yield one complex proposition. Unless this complex proposition
has the explanative force of an integrated principle, however, it does not yield a
untfied theory. Rather, it will have no more explanatory force than its components
had as single discrete principles. This concern has led first amendment theorists to

espouse multi-value and multi-principle approaches to resolve speech, expression and
conduct issues in constitutional law. See, e.g., Schauer, Categories and the First Amend-

ment." A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 276-77 (1981); Shiffrin, Defamatoy
Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915 (1978).
See also F. SCHAUER,FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). The search
for unified theories, as opposed to unitary ones, arises in physics and philosophy, too.
See, e.g., H. FRITZSCH, QUARKS 258-65, 281 (M. Roloff & H. Fritzsch trans. 1983); B.

Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in

LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE

177 (R. Marsh

ed. 1956).

37. R. LEFLAR,supra note 3, at 197.
38. Id. at 219-20.
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methodology for a case if the substantive law of the case intimately
involves geography.
This has been a long introduction to a complex of problems and
issues connected with rules and analytic methods for choice of law. In
the sections that follow, I examine some recent choice of law decisions
by the Minnesota Supreme Court and its related non-conflicts decisions. A rational reconstruction of the experience of this court with its
singular analytic method is instructive. Minnesota is poised to lay
down a rule for choice of law in tort, yet is having serious difficulties
in other areas--difficulties that stem from attempts to make one analytic method do the work of several. Minnesota's experience throws
into high relief problems common to all of the choice of law approaches and to the eternal question of the place of the courts in our
39
society.
39. The theories and principles I ascribe to the court in this article are based
upon what might be called a rational reconstruction of a number of that court's
decisions. In a sense, this is little different from the process that led Leflar to develop
his choice-influencing-considerations methodology. Leflar asserted that "[i]n the
minds of all commentators there has always been a continuing urge to focus upon the
true reasons that underlie choice-of-law adjudications, the basic choice-influencingconsiderations that actually lead or should lead the courts to one result or another in
particular cases or types of cases." Leflar, Conficts Law: More on Choice-Injlencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1585 (1966). A rational reconstruction, however,
casts a wider net than an analysis of the precise language of the court. More importantly, the Minnesota court has a peculiar approach in writing opinions that may be
a reflection of a philosophy of deciding cases on an ad hoc basis. The court regularly
has not grounded its decisions in a solid substantive analysis. Rather the court often
is content simply to state a rule for a case without citation to its own relevant precedent or statutes or without attempting to reconcile conflicting precedents. Sometimes
the court will remain silent in this regard; other times it cites precedent from other
jurisdictions without considering the precedent peculiar to that jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Melina v. Chapin, 327 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1982). In Meha, the court
refused to overturn a punitive damages award, allegedly excessive as a matter of law,
when there had been no evidence below concerning the defendant's ability to pay
punitive damages. The court cited (and arguably misinterpreted) a California decision for the proposition that punitive damages are to be limited to an amount reasonably necessary to punish and deter. Id. at 20 n.I (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
21 Cal. App. 3d 910, 928, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399, 582 P.2d 980, 990 (1978)). See K.
REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 10.3(D) (1980). In the process, the court ignored an
entire line of Minnesota precedent on the issue. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff,
319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (punitive damages are to punish and deter
tortfeasor; not available when tortfeasor is dead); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297
N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 1980); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 151
(Minn. 1980); Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 209, 115 N.W.2d 259, 266
(jury discretion on amount of punitives will not be disturbed on appeal unless so
excessive as to be deemed unreasonable), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Nelson v.
Halvorson, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912) (evidence of defendant's ability to
pay punitives is admissible because the purpose of punitives is punishment). See also
MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1980) (award amount necessary to further purpose of punitives; factors include defendant's ability to pay); 4 MINN. PRAC. JIG-II, 195 G-S (2d
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LAW COURT

The Minnesota Supreme Court long has been under fire for its
decisions on choice of law issues. Members of that court frequently
fire salvos in dissent, 40 and since 1973, scholars have kept up a barrage. 41 Even members of the United States Supreme Court have
taken some pot shots.42 The Minnesota court follows choice-influencing-considerations methodology for choice of law decisions. 43 Although Minnesota is not alone in utilizing this methodology, 44 there
ed. 1974) (recommended jury instruction to award amount necessary to punish defendant).
Admittedly, none of the above-cited precedent is precisely dispositive of the Melina case. However, by ignoring it, the court sends a message to the practicing bar
that an issue not precisely "on all fours" with local precedent is "up for grabs." The
message the court should send is that decisions of the court ought to fit together to
provide a cohesive structure upon which to develop the law. The rational reconstruction of Minnesota decisions in this article assumes this kind of cohesive structure in
order to examine a more general and pervasive question about the law of conflicts
when, in fact, the court's history has indicated an ad hoc approach.
40. See, e.g., Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 54 (Minn. 1979) (Otis,
J., dissenting), aJfd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); id. at 49 (Peterson, J., concurring);
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 171, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973) (Peterson, J.,
dissenting).
41. See Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice ofLaw, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 88688 (1980); Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules JudicialMethod in
Conflict Tort Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975, 1007-09 (1977); Comment, Conflict of Laws:
Minnesota Re'ects the "Significant Contacts" Doctrine in Favor of the "Better Law" Test, 58
MINN. L. REV. 199, 210 (1973); Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court. 1979, 64 MINN. L.
REv. 1181, 1187-91 (1980).
Of particular interest is Leflar's criticism that in applying his choice-influencingconsiderations methodology, the Minnesota court has erred in at least one instance.
See Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1089 n.48 (1981).
42. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320, 324 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("the Minnesota court's decision to apply Minnesota law was plainly
unsound as a matter of normal conflicts law"), afg 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979); id.
at 307 (Brennan, J. concurring) (declining to say "whether we would make the same
choice of law decision if sitting as the Minnesota Supreme Court").
Commentary on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. has raised a number of questions about the need for a national conflict of
laws policy in general, and the Minnesota court's standard in particular. See
Brillmeyer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems." As Between State and Federal Law,
79 MICH. L. REV. 1315 (1981); Shreve, In Search ofa Choice-of-Law Reviewing StandardReflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REV. 327, 336-40 (1982).
43. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973) (adopting the
choice-influencing-considerations methodology). See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note
3, at 195; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencig Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584 (1966); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267 (1966). For a list of Leflar's five choice-influencing-considerations, see note
18 supra.
44. See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. Homer,
38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
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is a special kind of criticism leveled at its court's decisions. 45 This
different treatment apparently stems from what the critics perceive as
the Minnesota Supreme Court's unswerving loyalty to Minnesota
law, as the "better rule of law" in choice of law problems. Some
writers have gone so far as to claim that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's choice of law "methodology" really is just the rule that " 'forum law applies' or, more simply, 'plaintiff wins.' ",46
That there is a difference between "forum law applies" and
"plaintiff wins" in choice of law problems was apparent in the court's
1981 decision in Bigelow v. Estate of Mathias.4 7 In that case, the Min-

nesota court chose an Iowa statute as the better law, thus allowing the
Iowa plaintiff to recover.4 8 This case is noteworthy not only because
the court finally broke its pattern of always choosing Minnesota law
as the "better law" in tort, but also because the Minnesota statute the
court rejected in Bigelow turned out five months later to be held unconstitutional in Thompson v. Estate of Petroff.49 This latter case in turn
appears seriously to soften the impact of the former and to leave the
reputation of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the area of conflicts
decisions substantially intact. Its reputation is that Minnesota's
choice of law issues always are resolved in favor of Minnesota law, on
a choice-influencing-considerations analysis that revolves on only a
"better law" label for Minnesota law.
Some scholars have objected to "better law" theories of choice of
law as "treacherous," "illegitimate in principle," too likely to be "parochial or self-regarding," and "too dangerous. 50 Such critical

charges would be all too true if a court that uses a better law rule has
no theory about wherein the betterness lies. 51

The Minnesota

45. But see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 328-29 (criticizing the use of the
choice-influencing-considerations methodology in both New Hampshire and
Wisconsin).
46. Comment, supra note 41, at 203. See also Davies, A Legislator's Look at Hague
and Choice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (1981). Professor Davies argued that

"[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court acts as if the state's manifest destiny is to rule all,
that its own law is to be applied in any event, despite the state boundary." Id. at 180.
47. 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
48. Id. at 16.
49. 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982). For further discussion of Bigeow and Thompson, see notes 60-76 and accompanying text infra.
50. Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeter, 1 VT. L.
REV. 1, 14 n.36 (1976). See also Shreve, supra note 42, at 341-42.
51. Without the objective analysis required by the better law rule, this approach
could degenerate into a "labelling" methodology whereby the forum law or the law
most favorable to the plaintiff simply would be declared to be the better law. For
example, the plaintiff in one Minnesota case, in urging the Minnesota court to apply
Minnesota's favorable automobile insurance "stacking" rule, simply cited a favorable
domestic decision and declared, "[T]herefore, there is no doubt that Minnesota law,
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Supreme Court not only has a theory about what makes one law better than another in tort conflicts cases, the court has stated that theory fairly clearly in its choice of law decisions. Further, this theory is
one the Minnesota Supreme Court utilizes even in tort cases that do
not involve choice of law issues.
In the realm of cases that have no tort aspects to them, for example pure contract cases rather than accident insurance contract cases,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has not recently had occasion to speak
in a choice of law context. But this merely raises a problem of theory
construction, and thus it is one evolving common law courts always
face: What shall be the theoretical content of "better law" here? We
could use some of the court's other contract decisions to forecast its
theoretic approach in pure contract conflicts cases. Here, however,
perhaps the court should not develop a better law theory. For saying
the court should apply the better of two competing rules of law in all
choice of law cases suggests, wrongly, that there can be one all-encompassing theory for choice of law decisions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have a two-part theory about what makes one rule of law better than another. The first
and more general part of this better law theory is that those rules of
law comporting with current social, economic, and legal reality are
better than those founded on outdated social, economic, and legal.
attitudes; and that those rules of law a majority of jurisdictions follow
are better than those a minority of jurisdictions follow. 52 Each of
these principles of this first part in turn is undergirded by a deeper
theory. Many plausible reasons exist for preferring more "modern"
rules or majority rules. Agreeing with the majority may be "easier"
than justifying a different opinion, or safer because the majority is
more likely to be correct. Moreover, agreeing with the majority may
contribute to a goal of uniformity. Not all such reasons are equally
good as deep theories of "betterness." Further, each of them is highly
which allows stacking, is the better rule of law." Brief for Respondents at 17, Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979) (citing Ehlert v. Western Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 195, 207 N.W.2d 334 (1973)). However, this labelling approach
is not a problem peculiar to a "better law" methodology, but arises in all "analytic"
methodologies. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
52. The Minnesota court has taken notice of the "needs of society" and "rules of
law which make good economic sense" in the recent decisions applying the "better
law" analysis. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 1982);
Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1981) (quoting Leflar, Conjkcts Law:
More on Choice-Infiuencing Consideralions, 54 CALIF. L. REV 1084, 1088 (1966)). When
there is a conflict between current social, economic, and legal reality and the rules of
a majority of jurisdictions, those rules that comport with the growing "trend" are
better than the out-dated rules of the majority. See Bigelow, 313 N.W.2d at 12-13; R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 6.6.
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likely to represent the personal view of individual judges rather than
the common vantage point of a whole court. This level of theory construction raises issues of jurisprudence and philosophy beyond the
scope of this article.
The general principle of the second part of the Minnesota's better law theory seems to be that those rules of law that fit the theory of,
and further the goals of, the body of the particular area of substantive
law giving rise to the cause of action are better than those that do not.
The individual principles of this second part of Minnesota's better
law theory then would be principles derived from the court's own
theories of various areas of substantive law. For example, the court's
theory of modern tort law is that it is a body of law based on a compensation philosophy.5 3 Tort rules that further this compensatory
policy, then, would be better than those that do not, and tort rules
that lead to full compensation are better than those that might tend
to undercompensate or deny compensation. 5 4 Given this view of the
basic policy of tort, Minnesota then could lay down a choice of law
rule for tort conflicts cases: Choose the substantive tort law that leads
to greater recovery for the tort victim.
Arguably, a court might view tort law as based on both a compensation and a punishment philosophy. This bifocal compensationpunishment view of tort is defensible historically, for tort grew out of
criminal law and continues today as one of the ways in which society
civilizes its members into meeting certain standards of conduct and
care. 55 A court also might adhere to this bifocal view of tort because it
holds a limited view of the propriety of compensating the citizens of
another jurisdiction injured within the forum state when compensation would not be available in the tort victim's state, but nonetheless
seeks to deter injurious conduct within its borders. 56 That is, choice
53. See Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d at 12-13. In Btgelow, the court found
that Minnesota's statutory bar to tort liability after the death of the tortfeasor was
out of line with the compensatory nature of modern tort causes of action, and therefore applied an Iowa law as a "better" rule of law in a conflicts case. Id.
54. For a discussion of the difference between undercompensation and no compensation, see notes 90-94 and accompanying text infra.
55. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 6-16, 898 (4th ed. 1971). See also 2 F.
POLLOCK &

F.

MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF

EDWARD I 510-42 (2d ed. 1898).
56. Traditional interest analysis recognizes a state's interest in protecting its own
citizens whether acting in-state or out-of-state and, thus, having its rules applied for
the benefit of its citizens. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 85-86 (1963). Professor Ely, for one, has criticised this view. See Ely, Choice
of Law andthe State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981)

(arguing for return to the lex loci rules except where both parties share a common
domicile). The converse of this analysis, with some basis in principles of comity
among the states, is that a state has no interest in protecting the citizens of other
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of law considerations might prompt a court to continue seeing a punishment policy in tort. If a court were to recognize both the punishment and compensation policies of tort law, 57 then it could choose
forum law for its own tort victim citizens whenever that choice leads
to a higher recovery than nonforum law would afford by claiming a
governmental interest in affording its own plaintiffs full compensation. 58 With a bit of prompting, the forum also could extend this
interest to those plaintiffs who were neither citizens of, nor residents
in, the forum but who, because they were injured in the forum, have
outstanding medical or property repair expenses there. 59 By providstates. Cf. Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843
(1982) (applying forum law to events occurring outside the forum where both parties
were forum domiciliaries, but reserving the question of whether its laws could govern
the conduct of non-citizens outside the forum).
57. At one time Minnesota seemed to recognize a punishment policy in tort.
For example, in one case, the Minnesota court applied a Minnesota dramshop statute
in an action against a Minnesota seller of liquor but arising from an accident in
Wisconsin. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
In Schmidt the court purported to follow the lex loci rule but characterized the place of
injury as Minnesota because the harmful action was based upon the sale of liquor in
Minnesota. Id. at 367. In doing so, however, the court emphasized Minnesota's interest in "admonishing" dramshop proprietors by applying a law which was "essentially remedial" and "penal in its characteristics." Id. at 367-68. Commentators have
praised the Schmidt decision. See Davies, supra note 46, at 174 n. 17 (noting Schmidt as
one of Minnesota's "finest cases"); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 301-02 (noting
Schmidt as the case that "opened the door" to modem tort conflicts analysis).
In a second case, the Minnesota court refused to allow the application of the
dramshop act, which provided for strict liability, against a Wisconsin dramshop
owner. The court did allow a common law action based upon negligence. Blarney v.
Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980). In Blarney,
the court made no mention of the penal characteristics of the drampshop statute.
Later cases have seemed to confuse the purpose and nature of the dramshop act. See
Seim v Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 811-12 (Minn. 1981) (referring to the statute as
providing for "absolute" liability); Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d
164, 166 (Minn. 1980) (commenting that the statute "has been described as both
penal and remedial in nature"). The court's tendency to shift its emphasis of the
purposes of such a statute is unsettling and further points out the adhoc nature of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions. See note 39 supra.
58. See,e.g., Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977)
(asserting forum's governmental interest in protecting resident plaintiffs as justification for applying forum comparative fault statute over foreign contributory negligence rule); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (asserting
forum interest in welfare of its domiciliaries in applying forum law providing for
unlimited recovery).
59. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170-71, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973).
The court in Milkovich noted that
persons injured in automobile accidents occuring within our borders can
reasonably be expected to require treatment in our medical facilities, both
public and private. In the instant case, plaintiff incurred medical bills in a
Duluth hospital which have already been paid, but we are loath to place
weight on the individual case for fear it might offer even minor incentives to
"hospital shop" or to create litigation-directed pressures on the payment of
debts to medical facilities. Suffice it to say that we recognize the medical
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ing the fullest possible compensation to these plaintiffs, the forum
would make other forum citizens more likely to be paid for the services rendered to the tort victim.
Because the forum could claim a governmental interest in keeping tort victims from being charges on its own citizens' resources, the
court could choose full compensation tort law for anyone who resides
in or is injured in the forum state. Any of these people may incur
medical expenses that they are unable to pay, the costs of which then
rest on the public through taxes, increased fees, or increased insurance
premiums. The unpaid physician, for example, recoups his or her
losses by charging higher fees to other patients. Further, the court
would not want to discourage tort plaintiffs from paying their medical or other bills by extending the full-compensation protection to
only those nonforum plaintiffs injured in the forum who had unpaid
medical and other bills at the time of trial. Hence, that these plaintiffs had incurred such tort expenses in the forum would be sufficient
justification for affording them full relief.
Having taken this step in reasoning, the forum court then could
say that a nonforum tort victim injured in the forum would be entitled to forum compensation protection even if the tort victim had not
incurred such outstanding expenses in the forum as long as the tort
victim might have incurred such expenses. Thus, a North Dakota woman injured in Minnesota should not have her substantive and remedial rights turn on the vagaries of which nearest physician and
hospital render medical services to her. Moreover, a North Dakota
plaintiff injured in Minnesota should be afforded the same full compensation even if the plaintiff does not discover the need for medical
attention until the plaintiff returns to North Dakota or willingly
foregoes medical attention until returning to her own North Dakota
doctor. By reasoning along these lines, a forum court could properly
extend its full-compensation policy to nonforum plaintiffs who are injured in the forum but who do not incur medical or other expenses
there.
Logically there is room to distinguish between the plaintiff who
does incur such expenses in the forum and the plaintiff who does not
incur these expenses in the forum. There is this room because the
alleged foundation for the forum governmental interests is thepossibili y that the plaintiff will become a charge of the state or that other
costs are likely to be incurred with a consequent governmental interest that
injured persons not be denied recovery on the basis of doctrines foreign to
Minnesota.
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forum citizens who have rendered services to the plaintiff might go
unpaid because the plaintiff is unable or unwilling to pay without
receiving full compensation. The upshot of this realization, however,
should not be a refusal to extend the full compensation policy to those
who did not incur expenses in the forum. Rather, we should realize
that this is no more than lex loci in disguise: forum plaintiff or forum
tort or actual forum expenses. Although there may be room for a
distinction between nonforum plaintiffs who incurred forum expenses
and those who did not, a court should ignore that distinction, which
only gives life to a relic of the past.
Thus, a forum court could easily arrive at a tort choice of law
rule that selects the fully compensating forum law for all its citizen
tort plaintiffs, wherever injured, and all tort plaintiffs injured in the
forum, on the grounds that this rule results in choices that advance
forum governmental interests and are choices of the better law, because that law is more fully compensatory.
What, then, about the tort plaintiff who is not from the forum
and who is not injured in the forum? One answer is to say that the
forum will extend its policy of full compensation to this tort plaintiff
when the tort defendant is from the forum, emphasizing not a compensation interest but a punitive interest. The forum could claim a
governmental interest in having forum citizen defendants held to a
uniform standard of care, irrespective of who the plaintiff is or where
the injury occurred. Allowing this forum defendant to escape liability
not only may begin the erosion of the standard of care, but also would
be unfair to other potential forum tort defendants. Hence, the forum
court, in almost any tort claim, could justify a choice of forum law as
the "better law" when that law furthers the forum's interest in providing compensation and punishment.
One hard case, however, points out the pitfalls in viewing tort as
being undergirded by both a compensation policy and a punishment
policy. This case arises in a choice of law context, where the forum's
tort recovery rule is restrictive and is statutorily fashioned by a legislature that does not share the hypothetical forum court's view that
fuller compensation in tort better serves the underlying policies of tort
law. The consideration of advancing forum governmental interest
then would seem to favor choosing the forum statute (undergirded by
the legislalure's view of forum governmental interest). The consideration of applying the better law, however, would seem to favor the
nonforum law, which provides fuller compensation for the tort victim
and greater punishment for the forum citizen tortfeasor (a function of
the court's view about tort).
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The most acute version of this particularly hard case then will be
one in which a non-resident plaintiff is injured outside the forum by a
forum defendant. In such a case, the court's bifocal theory of the
goals of tort law will point to choosing forum law as a result of the
legislature's declared governmental interest in shielding forum defendants from tort liability. Moreover, the legislature would also
have declared a governmental interest in not affording even forum
tort plaintiffs full compensation for those torts.
There are at least three ways to sever this Gordian knot. One is
to choose the forum law because it advances forum governmental interest, as the legislature perceived it, although it is not the better rule
of law as the court views the matter. A second way to resolve the
problem is to choose the full compensation, nonforum law because the
plaintiff and the place of the tort are nonforum. However, a choice so
grounded is a choice grounded on a lex loci rule and reasoning, and
that rule is not one a choice-influencing-considerations court can use
consistently with its declared methodology.
The third way to resolve the problem is to choose the nonforum
law that provides full recovery because it is better law. This choice,
however, would require recasting the court's rationale of wherein
"betterness" lies among tort recovery rules; the court would have to
drop the punishment rationale from its view about the forum's governmental interest. Hypothetically, that rationale is all that anchored
a choice of forum law for a nonforum tort victim on a nonforum tort,
and here the forum law essentially shields the forum defendant from
punishment. In the alternative, the court would have to say that
when there is a conflict between the forum's governmental interest
(no punishment) and the better rule of law (full compensation), the
latter outweighs the former. This second alternative has the effect of
keeping two of the choice-influencing considerations alive as separate
considerations. The first alternative has the effect of collapsing them;
for it keeps the forum's governmental interest consonant with the better rule of law, as the court perceives both betterness and forum
interests.
The Minnesota tort choice of law decisions long have been pregnant with an instinct to provide the tort plaintiff with compensation,
and, until recently, giving the tort plaintiff compensation or greater
compensation coincidentally was coextensive with choosing Minnesota law. 60 Certainly the court understood in the earliest guest-stat60. This has been particularly apparent in cases involving non-forum guest stat-

utes, the application of which the Minnesota court consistently has avoided. See Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn.
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ute cases that it chose Minnesota law in that context because
otherwise there would be no recovery or because otherwise the plaintiff's burden of proof made recovery unlikely. Certainly, too, the
court knew that it chose Minnesota law in one of its most controversial cases because that choice allowed the plaintiff greater recovery
than would the law of the other state. 61 But not until Bigelow v. Estate
of MathtZas62 did the court have to face head-on the hardest form of
the compensation issue. For not until Bigeow did the court have to
make the choice of law really fit within the framework of a better law
theory for the substantive law of torts. Moreover, in Thompson v. Estate
of Petroff,63 the court reinforced its choice in Bigelow by holding that
the Minnesota statute, which the court rejected in Bigelow in favor of
a "better" Iowa statute, violated the equal protection clause of the
Minnesota Constitution. Each of these cases involved nearly identical
facts and involved the application of a restrictive Minnesota survival
statute. Only the earlier Bigelow case, however, was cast in choice of
law terms.
In Bigelow, the plaintiff, an Iowa resident, 64 was assaulted and
seriously injured in her Iowa home by a Minnesota resident who subsequently committed suicide. 65 In a suit against the estate of the assailant in Minnesota state court, the defendant argued for the
application of Minnesota's survival statute, which provided that a
cause of action for an intentional tort died with the tortfeasor. 66 The
plaintiff urged that Iowa's law allowing the survival of the action
should apply.6 7 The trial court applied Iowa law as the "better law,"
68
and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.

8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254
(1968); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966). See also Baits v.
Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 65 (1966) (rejecting application of non-forum rule

of interspousal immunity).
61.
(1981).
62.
63.
64.

Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979), afd 449 U.S. 302
For a discussion of Hague, see notes 153-85 and accompanying text infra.
313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
At the time of suit, the plaintiff had become a Minnesota resident. Bigelow,

313 N.W.2d at 12.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 12.

68. Id. at 12-13. Relying on Milkovich, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that only the last two elements of the choice-influencing methodology, the advancement of forum governmental interests and the application of the better rule of law,
were relevant to cases arising in tort. Id. at 12. The court found that the forum had
no legitimate governmental interest in excluding recovery by the intentionally injured tort victim when such recovery would be permitted if the cause of action were
for negligent conduct. Id. In finding that the Iowa rule was the better rule, the court

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 313

In Thompson, Luella Thompson was assaulted in her home by
Raymond Petroff who "cut her with a knife, raped her, and twice
threatened to kill her."'69 Thompson then got hold of a gun, which
discharged and killed Petroff as the latter lunged for it.7° Thompson,
acquitted of murder and manslaughter charges on the grounds of self
defense, sued Petroff's estate in Minnesota state court for compensatory and punitive damages. 7' Unlike the plaintiff in Bigelow, Thompson could not circumvent the Minnesota survival statute because
both parties were Minnesota residents and the assault had occurred in
Minnesota. There was, then, no choice of law issue in Thompson.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court held the Minnesota survival
statute violated the equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution, 72 and gave Thompson a cause of action for an intentional tort
against the decedent-tortfeasor's estate for compensatory, but not pu73
nitive, damages.
In deciding Bigelow, the Minnesota Supreme Court had to answer at least one of two questions: (1) Does Minnesota's governmental interest in tort include punishing Minnesota tortfeasors; and (2) Is
Minnesota's statute precluding recovery for intentional torts against
the estates of tortfeasors better than an Iowa statute that provides for
the survival of a cause of action for intentional torts against the representatives of decedent tortfeasors? To the court's everlasting credit, it
answered both these questions in Bigelow and reinforced those answers in Thompson. In giving these answers, the court came to the
point that it could now set forth a rule for choice of law in tort. The
court also placed itself in a position to see that it need not take a
limited view of the propriety of extending protection to tort plaintiffs
74
hailing from other jurisdictions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court stressed in each of these cases
that the policy central to tort law is compensation for injury. Moreover, it rejected any theory of tort based on a punitive philosophy.
Modern tort law, the court said, looks toward compensation of the
tort victim, not toward punishment of the tortfeasor. 75 By rejecting a
recognized that "[t]he modern law of assault and battery is essentially compensatory
and not punitive ... ." Id.
69. 319 N.W.2d at 401.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id. at 406.
73. Id. at 408.
74. For a discussion of the tort choice of law rules that Minnesota could now
establish, see notes 77-94 and accompanying text nira.
75. Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 405-407; Bigeow, 313 N.W.2d at 12. In Thompson,
the court explicitly noted that "compensation rather than punishment is now the
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punishment as a tort goal, the court cleared the way for choosing the
Iowa statute as the better law in B'gelow, and for invalidating the
Minnesota statute in Thompson. In Bigelow, the Minnesota court
could not further the compensation policy the court otherwise would
see in tort law by choosing a Minnesota law designed to deny compensation (and similarly to prevent punishment). None of the policy
reasons a court ordinarily might have had in Bigelow for choosing
Minnesota law could be furthered, then, by choosing Minnesota law;
but these policies could be furthered by choosing Iowa law. Yet the
policies of the Minnesota legislature would have been furthered only
by choosing Minnesota law. The consideration of advancing Minnesota's governmental interest seemed to point in opposite directions.
Bigelow and Thompson show something more than the possibility
of generating a substantively-based tort choice of law rule. They also
show that, for tort cases at least, the Minnesota Supreme Court's
choice-influencing-considerations methodology really does boil down
to a "better law" rule. The Minnesota Supreme Court is unwilling to
take the Minnesota legislature's view of Minnesota's governmental interest when the interest is in conflict with what the supreme court
views as the better rule of law. When there is a conflict between the
legislature's view of Minnesota's interests and the court's view that a
non-Minnesota law is better, the court has chosen the better law and
said, in effect, that that choice and that law advance Minnesota's governmental interests. 76 The court thus insists on being the ultimate
essential purpose of any tort cause of action. . . ." 319 N.W.2d at 405. In other
cases, the court has put the tort policy in terms of "fullest compensation." Compare
Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 49 ("fully compensating," "compensate... to the full extent")
to the
and at 47 ("interest in maximizing the tort recovery," "compensating...
maximum extent. . .even where this recovery is greater than minimum requirements") wilh Bigelow, 313 N.W2d at 12 ("fully compensated"). But note that when
the Bigelow court cites Hague in connection with tort compensation policy, it cites
Hague at 48 ("full compensation"), not at 47 or 49. Ad. For further discussion of the
problem Hague poses to my analysis of the tort choice of law rule, see notes 153-85
and accompanying text 'nfra.
76. In Bigelow the court noted as follows: "[T]his court has often said that it is
in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated." 313
N.W.2d at 12 (citing Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. 1978),
aft, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)). In Thompson, the court invalidated the Minnesota survival statute under the state requirement of equal protection, stressing that
"[i]ntentional torts have been omitted from the survival statute for no apparent reason other than the legislalure's failure to keep up with the development of modern tort
law." 319 N.W.2d at 405 (emphasis added) In a sweeping assertion of judicial authority, the court continued by noting that
when an old rule is found no longer to serve the needs of society, it should
be set aside and replaced with one that reflects the interests and the will of
the people and the demands ofjustice. "The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasisovereign that can be identified . .. .
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arbiter of wherein lie Minnesota's governmental interests. This
means there is no real distinction in Minnesota between the consideration of advancing forum governmental interest and the consideration of choosing the better law in tort choice of law. The Minnesota
Supreme Court's approach thus is one of a "better law" theory for
tort issues; it is not today a choice-influencing-considerations
methodology.
III.

FITTING A TORT CHOICE OF LAW RULE WITH NONCONFLICTS TORT CASES

The rule Minnesota now could lay down for choice of law in tort
is "choose the more fully compensating tort law." 7 7 This rule would
be geared to the policy of compensation in tort. Choices in accordance with this rule would result in the application of tort laws that
give effect to the underlying policies of tort as the court perceives those
policies. This rule could not be applied, however, without a reasoned
analysis of the conflicting substantive laws to determine which of
them is more fully compensating. But this analysis would eliminate
any analysis of, or reference to, the fortuitous loci factors of old, as
well as any weighing of the governmental interests of different jurisdictions. Such a tort choice of law rule would mark a complete break
with the lex loci*past. For all that, however, this probably is not the
tort choice of law rule Minnesota would or should announce.
Suppose, for example, a Minnesota state employee, acting within
the scope of employment, negligently injured a Californian in California, where there is no statutory ceiling on negligence recoveries for
personal injury. In general, Minnesota waives sovereign immunity in
tort to a statutory ceiling of $500,000.78 If the California tort victim
were foolish enough to sue in a Minnesota state court, would the Minnesota court limit the plaintiffs recovery to the $500,000 ceiling, or
would the court apply California law as the better rule of law because
it leads to fuller compensation?
Arguably, Minnesota case law suggests the court would not apply Minnesota law but rather that it would apply the California noId. at 407 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.
dissenting)).
77. By consistently framing tort policy in terms of "full compensation," the
Minnesota court has given the appearance of having already adopted this rule. See
note 75 supra. Although the court may have suggested the adoption of this rule, it is
not the rule suggested by this article. For a discussion of the particular challenges
that the Hague decision raises to the choice of law analysis offered in this article, see
notes 153-85 and accompanying text infra.
78. See MINN. STAT. § 3.736(4)(b) (1982).
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ceiling law because it is more fully compensating. 79 Irrespective of
these predictions, however, clearly the California tort victim would be
foolish to sue in Minnesota, in light of the greater chance of successful
suit in California.8 0 By bringing suit in Minnesota, the plaintiff
would forego a low-risk alternative to force a conflict between the
Minnesota judiciary and legislature over the forum's appropriate tort
policy. In effect, the plaintiff would risk that the court would sidestep
the conflict and defer to the legislature's formulation of tort policy by
applying forum law.
That Bigelow, Thompson, and other Minnesota cases somehow
dictate that a Minnesota court would choose California law and later
invalidate Minnesota's statutory ceiling actually is far from clear.
There is a substantial difference between giving the tort victim a real
opportunity of compensation and providing the fullest possible compensation. In the survival-of-action cases, the court faced a choice
between no compensation and some compensation."' In the guest
statute cases, the court faced a choice between unlikely-to-yield compensation on a gross negligence standard and likely-to-yield compensation on an ordinary negligence standard.8 2 In the hypothetical
statutory ceiling case, the choice is between some compensation and
more compensation. 3 In view of this variation of the problem, the
79. Moreover, the Minnesota court's decision in Thompson suggested that the
court would later invalidate the Minnesota statutory ceiling in order to bring the
court's purely local decisions into line with its choice of law decisions. See notes 69-73
and accompanying text supra. Minnesota has in fact invalidated a statutory ceiling
on tort damages contained in a portion of the dramshop statute. See McGuire v. C &
L Restaurant, 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984). McGutre involved a Minnesota plaintiff
whose cause of action arose before the legislature had repealed the statutory ceiling.
Id. at 608-09. The court invalidated the ceiling in this case on state equal protection
and tort compensation policy grounds. Id. at 615.
For a discussion of the need for consistency between choice of law decisions and
"local" decisions, see notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
80. Cf. Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 355 (1972) (rejecting application of Nevada statute limiting liability of state
government where Nevada employee injured California residents on a California
highway), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 820 (1973), on remand, 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 439 (1977), aft'd, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The hypothetical in the text is based
upon the facts of the Hall case except that the place of the injury is moved from the
forum to the non-forum state.
81. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra.
82. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
Mikovich presented the choice between a non-forum guest statute unlikely to yield
compensation because it required proof of gross negligence and the general negligence rule of the forum. Id. at 157, 203 N.W.2d at 410.
83. This choice between greater compensation and less compensation has been
faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d
43 (Minn. 1979), affd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). For a discussion of Hague, see notes 13869 and accompanying text znfra.
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suggested tort choice of law rule becomes plainly overly simplistic.
The inadequacy of this rule is further illustrated by the fact that it
ignores the notion of any punishment policy underlying some substantive tort laws, and particularly tort remedy laws.8 4 Thus, a rule
such as "choose the more fully compensating tort law" is not sufficiently complex for all tort choice of law problems.
In the Thompson decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused
to award punitive damages for intentional conduct in a suit brought
against the estate of a dead tortfeasor. 85 A few courts have claimed
that punitive damages in personal injury suits are really compensation to the plaintiff for "imponderables" rather than punishment of
the defendant.8 6 In Minnesota, however, punitive damages are
awarded simply to punish the tortfeasor for his outrageous conduct
and to deter him from repeating that conduct. 8 7 Therefore, as the

court in Thompson held, where the tortfeasor is dead there is no one to
punish, no potential for repetition, and punitive damages should not
be available.
Punitive damages awards usually reflect a punishment policy.
There are other tort remedy rules that have punishment built into the
measure of damages. 88 Such rules often will be statutory, representing a departure from the modern common law norm of the compensation policy in tort. Perhaps when Minnesota courts state that "tort
policy is on of compensation," the courts are making particular and
singular reference to tort liability rules, such as whether there is a
cause of action, what are the applicable standards of care and what
84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 561.04 (1982) (providing treble damages for the
willful severence of timber from state lands).
85. 319 N.W.2d at 408.
86. Michigan, in particular, recognizes punitive or "exemplary" damages as
compensation for humiliation, outrage, or mental distress. See Ten Hopen v. Walker,
96 Mich. 236, 240, 55 N.W. 657, 658 (1893); Veselenak v. Smith, 414 Mich. 567, 57274, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1982); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 409
Mich. 401, 419, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (dictum); McFaddan v. Tate, 350 Mich.
84, 89, 85 N.W.2d 181, 184 (1957). See also Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873)
(allowing increased compensaloo, damages for wanton acts, but rejecting the notion
that a civil court may punish a tortfeasor as "monstrous heresy").
Often an award of punitive damages may be simply a means to reimburse the
plaintiff for his attorney fees. Connecticut nearly is explicit in this regard. See
Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 578, 150 A. 692, 692-93 (1980) (measuring "compensatory punitive damages" for the injury to plaintiff by the amount of plaintiff's
attorney fees less taxable costs).
87. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 1980).
See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES, § 77, at 275 (1935); W. PROSSER,
supra note 8, § 2, at 9.
88. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (antitrust treble damages).
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defenses are available.8 9 To say "Choose the more fully compensatory tort law" in this context is not neceessarily to say "Choose the
most generous tort remedy."
Minnesota's theories of tort recovery in the areas of conversion
and fraud further support the principle that the promotion of a full
compensation policy in tort is separate and distinct from a policy advocating the greatest possible recovery. As one example, Minnesota
follows a minority rule that an innocent purchaser of converted property is liable to the rightful owner for only the value of the converted
property at the time and place of the original conveision. 90 In such a
case, the subsequent converter is not liable for any increased value in
the property that arises from additions made by the original converter. 9 1 This rule imposes a limitation not on the liability of the
defendant, but only on the remedy available against him. In the area
of fraud, Minnesota follows a minority rule limiting a defrauded
plaintiff to the recovery of his out-of-pocket expenses rather than
granting the full benefit of the bargain. 92 Minnesota's adherence to
this rule thus further suggests that it does not have a "fullest compensation" tort policy. Ordinarily, the benefit-of-the-bargain rule will
lead to greater recovery. 93 If Minnesota's cases really stand for the
89. See, e.g., Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 405. The court in Thompson stated that

"[u]nder modern tort theory, the primary reason for the existence ofa cause ofaction is to
provide a means of compensation for the injured victim." Id. (emphasis added). For
a further discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's view of its tort policies, see
note 75 supra.

90. See Mineral Resources, Inc. v. Mahnomen Constr. Co., 289 Minn. 412, 184
N.W.2d 780 (1971). The court chose this rule at least in part because it saw no need
to deter the innocent purchaser's conduct. Id. at 419-20.
91. The majority rule is that the innocent purchaser is liable to the original
owner for the value of the converted goods at the time and place of his own purchase,
thus providing the potential of increased compensation for additions and improvements made by the original converter. See Grays Harbor Cty. v. Bay City Lumber
Co., 47 Wash. 2d 879, 289 P.2d 975, 977 (1955). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 comments d, f and g (1979); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES 403 & n.3 (1973).
92. Out-of-pocket damages represent the difference between what the plaintiff
paid and the actual value of what he received. See Lowery v. Dingman, 251 Minn.

125, 86 N.W.2d 499 (1957); Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 246 Minn. 1, 74
N.W.2d 305 (1955). See also Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960)
(applying Minnesota law).
93. The "benefit of the bargain" rule awards damages representing the difference between the actual value of what the plaintiff received and the value as represented. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 595. In the common transaction, when the
defendant asserts falsely that the actual value is greater than the purchase price-that
the plaintiff is getting a "deal"-the benefit of-the-bargain rule will lead to greater
recovery than the out-of-pocket rule. See id. at 595-96. Applying an out-of-pocket
rule in such a situation, however, as Minnesota would, seems to serve an unspoken
equitable consideration that the plaintiff is somewhat tainted by his own greed. On
the other side of the coin, when there is a representation as to qualitative value rather
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proposition that Minnesota's tort policy is one offullest compensation,
Minnesota should choose the fuller recovery measure in fraud choice
of law and seek to change its own law in fraud later. If the tort choice
of law really is a fullest recovery rule, then one should expect to see a
wholesale reworking of these Minnesota minority tort remedy rules,
which do not comport with a tort policy offullest compensation.
Perhaps, then, a more sophisticated tort choice of law rule could
be fashioned, a rule more adequately representing the substantive tort
policies of Minnesota. For example, Minnesota could choose the tort
habi'lity rule that is more likely to enable the tort victim to recover
compensation for injuries, but choose the tort remedy rule that limits
the tort victim's recovery to actual compensation unless there is some
special reason to punish this tortfeasor. In most cases, keeping the
victim's recovery "tailored to" compensation for loss means erring on
the side of undercompensation rather than overcompensation, since
only in special cases is the tort remedy law geared to punishing the
tortfeasor. That probably is exactly the point the Minnesota
Supreme Court intended to make when it explained that the modern
policy of tort law is one of compensation for injury but not of punishment for doing harm. 94 Hence, to return to the hypothetical of the
sovereign immunity waiver up to a statutory ceiling, Minnesota could
justify choosing Minnesota law under the two-fold rule; this choice
would be consistent with the tort views of Bigelow and Thompson concerning the existence of causes of action in tort. Similarly, the court
could justify choosing its lower recovery measures for innocent-second-converter and for fraud on the ground that the Minnesota law
more adequately limits the remedy to actual damages. Minnesota
would do well to announce a tort choice of law rule along these
lines.9 5
IV.

POTENTIALS FOR TERRITORIALITY FOR CHOICE OF LAW IN
ESTATES AND "PROCEDURAL"

CASES

A "better law" choice of law theory for tort may lead to an appropriate tort choice of law rule, but will it lead to an adequate rule
than monetary value, application of the out-of-pocket rule will reward the plaintiff
who, because of "his own folly," has paid more than the property as represented
would be worth. See, e.g., Estell v. Myers, 56 Miss. 800 (1879). Because of these
anomalies there is some recent movement to reject slavish adherence to either rule in
favor of a more flexible approach consistent with the policies of tort, contract, and
equity in all of their full-blown complexities. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 597.
94. See notes 9 & 89, supra. See also Bigelow, 313 N.W.2d at 12.
95. Without such a rule, the court risks jumbling its cases in the future. Indeed,
Minnesota may already have jumbled the cases in Hague, but Hague involved both
tort and contract policies. See notes 153-85 and accompanying text infra.
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for contracts or estates or other areas of the law? More importantly,
is there any reason at all to attempt to use this theory outside the tort
context?
Two recent Minnesota decisions exemplify the pitfalls of the
choice-influencing-considerations methodology outside the context of
torts. The first is an estates case in which Minnesota purported to use
the choice-influencing-considerations methodology, and the other is a
recent case in which Minnesota abandoned that methodology in
favor of the questionable distinction between substantive and procedural law. These two cases illustrate that Minnesota is in serious intellectual difficulty in some non-tort choice of law areas.
In In re Estate of Congdon ,96 the Minnesota Supreme Court had to
decide whether to apply Minnesota or Colorado law to determine
whether a Colorado resident could benefit under a will and various
trusts established by a Minnesota decedent. 9 7 Under Colorado law, a
beneficiary under a will or trust who has been accused of killing the
testatrix arguably could plead an acquittal on murder charges to bar
a civil suit to determine the beneficiary's right to inherit. 98 Under
Minnesota law, the acquittal could not be pleaded in bar. 99
The court's discussion of the resolution of this conflict consists
almost entirely of two brief paragraphs:
In Milkovich v. Saari, this court adopted a method for
resolving conflict of laws questions. The analysis involves
the following "choice-influencing considerations:" (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task;
(4) advancement of the forum's governmental interest;
(5) application of the better rule of law.
96. 309 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. 1981).
97. Id. at 271. The beneficiary, acquitted in Minnesota on charges of conspiring
to murder her mother, sought to have Colorado law applied to determine her status
under her mother's will. Id. at 263-64. The beneficiary's husband, however, was
convicted for the murder. Id. at 63.
98. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-802(1) & (5) (1973). Colorado law is at best
ambiguous on the point, however. Under the express terms of the statute the point is
arguable.
99. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803(3) (1980) . The statute expressly provides that the
probate court may determine independently and by a preponderance of the evidence
whether the beneficiary intentionally and feloniously killed the testatrix. Id. Thus,
the acquittal would have no effect in the probate action.
The Congdon decision arose from consolidated interlocutory appeals of the grants
of motions admitting the will of the testatrix to probate and enjoining the distribution of trust income to the appellant pending the determination of her right to inherit. 309 N.W.2d at 264. Thus, her responsibility for the death of the testarix had
not been determined by the probate court.
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In applying these factors, including the application of
the Uniform Probate Code which is the law in a majority of
jurisdictions-we hold that Minnesota law applies. 100
MI'kovich is a torts choice of law case; 10 Congdon is an estates
case. Moreover, Milkovzih is a "better law" case in that the "better-

ness" of the Minnesota law ultimately tipped the scales under the
choice-influencing-considerations methodology.10 2 By citing
Aikovich and the Uniform Probate Code, the Congdon court suggests

that Congdon is also a "better law" case. The only reason to note the
Uniform Probate Code as "the law in a majority of jurisdictions" is in
10 3
connection with "better law" reasoning.
There might be "better law" decisions in estates conflicts cases,
but Congdon certainly should not be among them. Congdon represents
a false conflict in that there is no plausible theory of conflicts that
would authorize the application of Colorado law. 10 4 However, instead of recognizing the false conflict, the court quoted from the Minnesota statutes giving Minnesota courts jurisdiction over estates of
decedents domiciled in Minnesota,' 0 5 and reasoned that the rest of
Minnesota's probate code, including the statute that would not allow
100. 309 N.W.2d at 271 (citation omitted).
101. Mi/kovich involved the question of the applicability of an Ontario guest
statute in an action arising from a car accident occuring in Minnesota between Ontario residents. 295 Minn. 155, 197, 203 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1973).
102. 295 Minn. at 171, 203 N.W.2d at 417.
103. For a discussion of "better law" analysis, see notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra. However, note that the court's claim that the Uniform Probate Code

is the law in a majority of jurisdictions is false. Only 14 states have adopted the
U.P.C. in forD, and Kentucky has adopted only the code's trust portions. See UNIF.
PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983). California, New Jersey, and South Dakota have
adopted probate codes essentially the same as the U.P.C. Id. at 3-4. Virtually every
state has a rule similar to U.P.C. § 2-803, prohibiting one who murders a testatrix
from taking as a beneficiary under the will, but that rule was not in question in
Congdon. The court may have intended to indicate that of the states that have
adopted the U.P.C., a majority have, unlike Colorado, adopted its language permitting the probate court to determine independently the beneficiary's responsibility for
the death of the testatrix. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.305 (1979); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2803 (1974); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 560.2-803 (1976); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.251 (West 1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-104 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1973); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-804 (1975). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (1976); IDAHO CODE,
§ 15-2-803 (1971).
104. It is difficult to conceive of what possible interest the state of Colorado
might have in the probate of the estate in Congdon when the only Colorado contact
with the litigation was the domicile of the particular beneficiary. The application of
Colorado law arguably might have failed even the lax constitutional due process
standard limiting choice of law. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
105. 309 N.W.2d at 271 (citing MINN. STAT. § 524.1-302 (1980)).
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an acquittal to be pleaded in bar to a civil suit, also would apply. 106
In response to claims that the Colorado statute should apply, the
court simply cited Mlkovch and held Minnesota law applied. 10 7 The
court should simply have said that the plaintiffs choice of law argument was devoid of merit.
In purporting to give a reasoned explanation, by legitimate citations to earlier decisions and to statutes, the court has obscured the
grounds for its decision, since the apparent reasons cannot be the actual ones. The apparent reasons are that applying Minnesota law
advances Minnesota's governmental interest; that Minnesota's law is
better than Colorado's; and that Mikovch somehow dictates this
choice of Minnesota law. Yet Mtlkovich in the context of Congdon at
best stands for the proposition that Minnesota makes choice of law
decisions using choice-influencing-considerations methodology. However, the Milkovich analysis of forum governmental interest and its
"better law" analysis, grounded as they are in substantive tort policy,
are irrelevant to the estates context of Congdon. Further, even if the
choice in Congdon can be governed by the methodology the court
adopted in Mlkovi'h, the choice should turn solely on the consideration of advancing forum governmental interest (with adequate estates
policy analysis) and not on the betterness of the forum law. The only
sense in which Minnesota's law is better is apparently that it is forum
law.
Congdon is thus a right-result, wrong-reasons case. Indeed, Congdon is a right-result, no-reasons case. Although the court could have
articulated reasons for its holding, it instead gave only the illusion of
reasons. All things considered, the Minnesota Supreme Court would
have given us a better choice of law decision in Congdon had it handed
down a summary disposition, thus denominated. In fact, the Congdon
decision is no more than a summary disposition misleadingly cloaked
in a "better law" explanation.
If the Minnesota Supreme Court did not want to use a summary
disposition in Congdon, it should have fully explained the choice it
made. In rendering plenary opinions, a court should serve the important purposes of educating the legal community and preserving order
106. Id.
107. Id. The lawyers for the beneficiary in Congdon raised a number of additional losing arguments designed to prevent the probate of the will without the participation of the appellant in its benefits. They asserted improper jurisdiction and
venue in the county in which the decedent died; undue influence and a lack of testamentary capacity; the res judicata, collateral estoppel and double jeopardy consequences in a civil suit to determine appellant's responsibility for the death of the
testatrix; and the denial of a right to a jury trial on the issue of appellant's right to
inherit. Id. at 265-72. Of these, only the last raised even the slightest hope of success.
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in the common law. 108 To the extent that an opinion fails to serve
these purposes, a serious question is raised concerning the efficacy of
its publication. 10 9 To accomplish these goals, the court in Congdon
need only have explained that estates law traditionally belongs to the
sovereign and that, over the centuries, expectations have become so
settled in this area of the law that there is a policy in favor of applying forum law to forum estates of forum decedents. The lex loci rules
reflect the sovereign's power and, absent some special circumstances
not present in Congdon, there has been no reason to abandon the "old,
gasp, territorial learning"' 10 in estates law. The crux of the problem
108. More specifically, appellate opinions serve immediate functions of assuring
thoughtful review of the merits of the individual case, ensuring the acceptance of law
in society, and giving notice to parties and counsel of what is being done in the case
and why. See generally Leflar, Some Observations ConcerningJudicial Opinons, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 810, 810-12 (1961). Cf. D. Stevenson & J. Zappen, An Approach to Writing
Trial Court Opinions, 67 JUDICATURE 337 (1984).
109. See Leflar, supra note 108, at 814. See also APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS

309-19 (Leflar ed. 1974). The Congdon decision was, in fact, little more than a summary disposition disguised by lengthy statement of the facts to look like an opinion.
The Congdon decision is unusual in that none of the issues on appeal had any merit and
summary affirmance was thus entirely justified.
110. Ely, supra note 56, at 217. Few policies are as arbitrary as the "settled expectations" policy; hence few rules of law are as arbitrary as ones based on such a
policy. Most rules fit within a framework, the whole of which is more arbitrary than
any part.

Consider, for example, the rules of contract as a whole and one of its parts, the
mailbox rule. Mailed acceptances of offers need to be governed by a settled rule: we
could not endure having these acceptances sometimes effective upon mailing but
sometimes effective upon receipt, although we could endure uniformly reaching

either result. We could choose arbitrarily here, but we need not, for there is an overarching policy in contract rules, taken as a whole, of furthering reasonable marketplace transactions. That policy tips the balance in favor of the effective-uponmailing rule. Moreover, this result is consonant with another overarching policy of
contract law, that of freedom of contract. For any offeror may avoid the mailbox
rule simply by specifying in his offer that acceptance will not be effective until the
offeror receives it.

We can rationalize the mailbox rule to make it fit into contract law as a whole,
and it thus is not arbitrary. Contract law taken as a whole is more arbitrary. We
could have had policies of not furthering marketplace transactions and not allowing
economic freedom. Our society then would be quite different from what it is, and
perhaps people would try to circumvent such policies and their concommittant rules,
just as people tried to circumvent the rules disallowing disposition of realty by will or
by deathbed gift by creating a use. The latter came to a head in 1536 when the
Statute of Uses, by executing the use, vested legal title in the beneficial owner and
effectively prevented post-mortum disposition; that in turn led the gentry to demand
a means to devise, culminating in the Statute of Wills in 1540. A.W. SCOTT,
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1.2-1.6 (1960); T. ATKINSON, LAW OF
WILLS § 3 (2d ed. 1953). Sometimes the courts satisfy such demands of the people,
rather than the legislature. Even after the Statute of Uses, people wanted to create
uses, and courts allowed them to when the people created a use upon a use; the

Statute of Uses executed the first use and left the second one intact, according to the
courts. A.W. ScoTr, supra § 1.6. Historical developments such as these and the historically most deep-seated notion of property (i.e., real property)-indeed, the very
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in Congdon was that the Minnesota Supreme Court had committed
itself to one apparently all-encompassing theory of how to make
choice of law decisions. The court's tendency to limit that theory to a
"better law" theory served only to exacerbate the problem at a time
when the court ought to have recognized the need for a multiplicity
of choice of law methodologies.
The court has begun to recognize this need recently. In Davis v.
FurlongII in which the court could have used the choice-influencingconsiderations methodology to justify its choice of procedural law, the
court eschewed the methodology in favor of a substance-procedure
distinction.1 1 2 For all that, however, even in Davis the court insisted
that it would follow the choice-influencing-considerations methodology for substantive choice of law issues. 11 3 Thus, Minnesota has not
yet seen any reason to question the soundness of its approach in
Congdon.
The issue in Davis was whether the plaintiff could bring an action against the defendant's insurer in Minnesota before obtaining a
judgment against the defendant.1 1 4 Minnesota's common law prohibits direct action against the insurance company. 11 5 Wisconsin's
name of estate law-indicate how closely this body of law is tied to concept of territorial sovereignty. Thus, when I say estates law traditionally has belonged to the sovereign, I mean initially to the crown, but always to the British legal system as opposed
to the French or German systems. For estate law, each state in the United States
stands to other states as England stands to France.
111. 328 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1983).
112. The traditional rule was that conflicts analysis would apply only to substantive issues and the forum, in its role as the forum, would apply its own procedural
rules when the issue could be characterized as "procedural." See generall Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933). But see R.
LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 240 (choice-influencing methodology applies to all choice of
law issues, including procedural issues). The question of characterization presents
courts with another "escape" device to avoid an undesirable result under the mandated choice-of-law methodology or rule. See, e.g., Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600,
124 N.E. 477 (1919). See generally, R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 55-67. For a
discussion of other ways in which courts might avoid an undesirable choice of law
result, see notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
113. See Davis, 328 N.W.2d at 152-53.
114. Id. at 151. Plaintiff, injured in a car accident in Wisconsin, sued three
defendants in Minnesota: the driver of the car in which she was riding, the driver of a
second car, and the owner of the second car. Id. The "host" driver was a Minnesota
resident; the other two defendants were Wisconsin residents. Id. The plaintiff received medical care in Minnesota. Id. Subsequent to filing suit, the plaintiff filed a
motion to add as another defendant the insurer of the driver in the second car, which
was a Wisconsin corporation also doing business in Minnesota. The policy was entered into in Wisconsin, and contained an express "no action" provision prohibiting a
direct action against the insurer until judgment was obtained against the insured. Id.
at 151-52.
115. Id. at 152 (citing Miller v. Market Men's Mut. Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 509, 115
N.W.2d 266 (1962)).
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direct l'abihty statute provides that a liability insurer is directly liable
to persons entitled to recover from the insured, even if a judgment has
not yet been rendered against the insured.' 16 Wisconsin's direct action
statute provides the plaintiff may recover against the insurer of an
insured in negligence as long as the insurance policy was "issued or
delivered" in Wisconsin, or "the accident, injury or negligence oc17
curred" in Wisconsin.'
These two Wisconsin statutes have had a tortured history, 1 8 and
the Minnesota Supreme Court arguably erred in its understanding of
the effect of these statutes on a "no action" clause in an insurance
contract. 119 Instead of facing the issue, the Minnesota court focused
on the fact that the direct-action statute is part of the Wisconsin rules
of civil procedure.120 The statute clearly is a "right of action" statute;
however, it is designed to work in tandem with the direct-liability
statute, which is a "right" statute. Under Wisconsin law, insurers can
avoid being named as party defendants in negligence liability suits
only when the insurer issued and delivered the policies outside Wisconsin and the accident, injury, or negligence occurred outside Wisconsin.' 2 1 In such a case, there is a right without a right of action.
116. WIS. STAT. ANN.
117. WIs. STAT. ANN.

§
§

632.24 (West 1980).
803.04(2) (West 1977).

118. As originally enacted, the two statutes contained some discrepancies in language that the Wisconsin court refused to gloss over, insisting on enforcing the statutes as enacted rather than overlook what arguably was legislative slippage. See, e.g.,
Frye v. Angst, 28 Wis. 2d 575, 137 N.W.2d 430 (1965). In 1971, the Wisconsin legislature amended the liability statute to bring it into conformity with the right of action statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN § 803.04(2) (West 1977).
119. See 328 N.W.2d at 152. The Minnesota court stated that under Wisconsin
law an express "no action" clause would be enforced whenever the Wisconsin right of
action statute was inapplicable. Id. (citing Frye v. Angst, 28 Wis. 2d 575, 137
N.W.2d 430 (1965); Morgan v. Hunt, 196 Wis. 298, 220 N.W. 224 (1928)). However,
the peculiar facts of the cited cases, and particularly their timing in relation to the
enactment and amendment of the Wisconsin statute, raises at least the possibility
that the law in Wisconsin may be less settled than the Minnesota court implies.
120. 328 N.W.2d at 152. Section 803.04 provides for the permissive joinder of
parties. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 803.04 (1977). As the Minnesota court noted, one Wisconsin decision has characterized this statute as "procedural" in nature. 328 N.W.2d
at 152 (citing Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis. 2d 281, 142 N.W.2d 855 (1966)). But see
note 119 and accompanying text supra.
121. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.04(2) (1977). This is the only circumstance in
which a Wisconsin court would enforce an express "no-action" clause in an insurance
agreement. A court might, however, recognize a common law cause of action against
an insurer and refuse to enforce the "no action" clause, despite the procedural limitation of § 803.04. For example, a Minnesota resident injured in Minnesota and insured under a policy issued in Minnesota might make a bona fide change of residence
to Wisconsin and sue the insurer (doing business in Wisconsin and subject to suit
there) in Wisconsin. By recognizing a non-statutory rule, the Wisconsin court thus
might allow a common law direct action.
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Otherwise, there is a legislatively created right of action tailor-made
for a legislatively created right.
This should have suggested to the Minnesota Supreme Court
that the direct action statute is a "substantive procedural" statute-a
122
statute that would apply in federal court on Erie grounds.
Rather than analyzing its choice under its choice-influencingconsiderations methodology, the Minnesota court applied the very
23
general rule that the law of the forum governs procedural matters.
The court called this a lexfori rule; but a lexfori rule about procedural
rules is really a lex loci rule in that locus and the forum are identical,
differing only in the sort of ways 'the morning star' and 'the evening
star' differ as names for Venus. Although there is nothing wrong with
accepting this rule in connection with procedural issues, failing to
provide some analysis of why this should be the choice of law rule is
wrong. Moreover, the court needs to explain how to distinguish procedural rules from substantive ones.' 24 That Minnesota failed in Davis on each of these counts is only compounded by the fact that the
122. See Utz v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 7, 9 n.l (7th Cir. 1980)
(citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (recognizing the applicability of
§ 803.04(2) in a federal court diversity action). The Seventh Circuit in Utz asserted
that under Wisconsin conflicts law, § 803.04(2) would be considered procedural and
would be applied by Wisconsin court regardless of the substantive law governing the
case. Utz, 619 F.2d at 9 n.1 (citing Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465

(1933)).
123. See Davis, 328 N.W.2d at 153. The court paused to consider whether to
apply the choice-influencing-considerations methodology to issues characterized as
"procedural," but rejected the notion on the ground that a requirement of duplicating non-forum procedure rules would interfere with judicial efficiency in the forum.
Id. (citing R. LEFLAR, SUpra note 3, § 121 at 239). One justice, however, would have
extended the choice-of-law methodology to procedural rules. See 328 N.W.2d at 15354 (Todd, J. dissenting).
124. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 55-59. Consider a slightly
more difficult case in which the plaintiff brings a cause of action in quasi-contract to
recover the unjust profits earned by the defendant in publishing a libelous book in a
jurisdiction in which the tort statute of limitations has run but the contract statute
has not. Moreover, consider that there is an available non-forum tort statute of limitations that has not run. Further suppose the contract statutes of limitations have not
run in either jurisdiction. Should the forum allow the plaintiff to use the nonforum
tort statute of limitations? Of course not, and for similar reasons, the forum should
not allow the plaintiff to use the forum contract statute of limitations. The plaintiff's
action should be dismissed with prejudice in the forum as being time-barred-that is
the penalty for choosing the wrong forum, and there is nothing improper in such a
result. The plaintiff had his choice and his day in court, and the defendant is entitled
not to be hailed into court repeatedly. In reaching this result, however, the court
should not simply say "lex fort' for procedure," nor should the court simply say
"greater relationship/weightier contacts with the forum." Rather, the court should
think through the policies bound up with its statute of limitations for libel and the
relation of the assumpsit action to the underlying substantive tort wrong. For a consideration of a factually similar (but not identical) case, see Hart v. E. P. Dutton &
Co., 197 Misc. 274, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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Wisconsin direct action statute may well not be a purely procedural
statute and that Minnesota wholly failed to address this issue. What
the Minnesota court essentially did was to fortify its decision by issuing an arbitrary procedural characterization, and thereby avoid applying the choice-influencing methodology to the difficult direct
action issues.
In reaching this decision in Davis, the court purported to distinguish one of its earlier cases, Meyers v. Government Employees Insurance
Co. 125 Meyers involved an accident that had occurred in Louisiana. 126
Applying the choice-influencing methodology to resolve two choice of
law issues, the Meyers court first allowed the Minnesota plaintiff to use
a Louisiana "direct action" statute. 12 7 It then determined that Minnesota's tort statute of limitations, rather than Louisiana's shorter
28
statute, applied to the action.'
In Davis, the court claimed that Meyers was distinguishable because the Meyers "direct action" was a substantive right. The Meyers
court therefore "did not have reason to extend the [choice-influencing
methodology of the] Milkovich analysis into the realm of procedural
rules."' 129 That is, the court claimed in Davis that the issue of whether
its choice of law methodology applied to procedural rules was a question of first impression. 30 The Davi's court thus blithely ignored the
Meyers court's rejection of the traditional substantive/procedural
dichotemy implicit in the latter's use of the choice-influencing methodology on the statute of limitations question.
Moreover, there is serious reason to question the difference between the Meyers "direct action" statute and the Davis direct action
statute. The Louisiana statute applied in Meyers provided that a direct action lay in Louisiana courts for anyone who was injured in
Louisiana.' 3' The relevant portion of the court's quotation of that
statute provides as follows:
The injured person . . .shall have a right of direct action
against the insurer... ; and such action may be brought
125. See Davis, 328 N.W.2d at 152 n.2 (distinguishing Meyers v. Government
Emp. Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974)).
126. 225 N.W.2d at 242, 244.
127. Id. at 239 (court's syllabus note 4), 242-43. See also Justice Kelly's specially
concurring opinion, in which he goes on to discuss the better law consideration on the
statute of limitations issue. Id. at 244-45 (Kelly, J., concurring). He concluded that

Minnesota's six-year statute was better than Louisiana's one-year statute. Id. at 245
(Kelly, J., concurring).

128. Id. at 240.
129. Davis, 328 N.W.2d at 152 n.2.

130. See id. at 152-53.
131. AMeyers, 225 N.W.2d at 240 n.3.
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• . . in the parish in which the accident or injury occurred
or in the parish in which an action could be brought . . .
under the general rules of venue. . . . This right of direct
action shall exist whether the policy . . . was written or delivered in . . . Louisiana. . . and whether. . . such policy
contains [a "no action" clause], provided the accident or in32
jury occurred within . . . Louisiana.'
The Davis court ignored the fact that the Louisiana statute combined
both a right and a right of action in one statute, whereas Wisconsin
divides its right and right of action into two statutes, the latter of
which (the direct-action statute) Wisconsin puts in its rules of civil
procedure. The statutes of these two states otherwise are not distinguishable on thei'rfaces. But the Meyers court relied upon the fact that
Louisiana courts treat the "direct action" statute as creating substantive rights, 33 and the Davis court relied upon the fact that Wisconsin
courts treat the direct-action statute as procedural. 134 And, just as the
Meyers court ignored that the Louisiana "direct-action" statute contained detailed venue provisions, so too the Davis court ignored that
the Wisconsin direct-action statute applied anytime the accident occurred in Wisconsin, even if the policy had not been issued or delivered in Wisconsin. 135 The Meyers court arguably erred with respect to
whether the Louisiana statute is purely substantive; the Davis court
arguably erred not only with respect to whether Wisconsin's statute is
solely procedural, but also with respect to whether Meyers is distinguishable on the issue of the nature of the direct-action statute. In
any case, the Davis court overruled an aspect of Meyers sub-silentio; for
Meyers used a choice-influencing methodology on the statute of limitations questions which, under traditional choice of law theories, are
procedural. 36 Thus, by distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules, the Davis court reintroduced the old choice of law characterization evils which the Meyers court had rejected. Moreover,
Davis simply is not instructive on how to distinguish between substantive and procedural rules.
V.

CHOICE OF LAW FOR CONTRACTS CASES

Predicting what the Minnesota court will do with choice of law
132. Id.
133. Id. at 241 (citing West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189,.46 So. 2d 122

(1950)).
134. See note 117 supra.
135. See notes 111-18 and accompanying text supra.

136. See, e.g., E.F. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 2, §§ 3.9-3.12.
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issues arising in contract claims is difficult. 3 7 The court has given
full effect to a contract choice of forum clause when that choice was
reasonable and fair.' 38 The court probably will treat equally favorably negotiated choice of law clauses.' 3 9 However, there are few recent
cases upon which to base a prediction about the direction the court
will take in contract choice of law cases. Further, there is little reason
to believe that the choice-influencing-considerations methodology
will be of much help to the court in this area.
Under the Leflar methodology, the consideration of predictability of results supposedly has greater bearing on consensual transac140
tions choice of law issues than in, for example, torts choice issues.
At its most general level, the predictability consideration is just a
principle of fairness pervading our entire jurisprudence and thus is of
no special help in making any choice of law decisions. On a more
narrow level, the Leflar predictability consideration suggests that a
contract choice of law issue, for example, should be resolved in favor
of the law the parties expectedwould apply to their contract.' 4 1 When
parties express their expectation on this point, as in a choice of law
clause, the court faces a question of basic contract interpretation, not
a choice of law problem.
When parties have not expressed their expectations, however, the
court still faces a contract interpretation 4 2 problem that only appears
to be a conflicts issue. In deciding such a case, the court should pro137. Traditionally, the favored rule was that the law of the place of the making
of the contract, referred to as lex loci contractus, governed all issues of validity and
formation of the contract, and the law of the place of performance governed questions of contract performance and breach. See generally, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-376 (1934); J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 311-375 (1935).
138. See Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., 320 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1982). Specifically the court in H-auenstein enumerated three factors to be
considered in determining the validity of a choice of forum clause: 1) the relative
convenience of the forum; 2) the relative bargaining power of the parties; and 3) the
reasonableness of the other parts of the agreement. Id. at 890-92 (citing Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
139. The contract in Hauenstein did contain a choice of law provision. See 320
N.W.2d at 887. However, the court's decision to dismiss the action in Minnesota, in
conformity with the choice offorum clause, precluded its determination of the validity
of the choice of law provision.
140. See generally, R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, § 103, at 205-06.
141. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, § 103, at 205-06; Leflar, Confl ts Law, More on
Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1586 (1966).
142. For purposes of this article, the term "interpretation" is used in a broader
sense than that usually meant in contract law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 213 comment a (1981) (distinguishing between a parol evidence issue
and an interpretation issue). As used here, the term refers to any question of the
meaning of terms of a particular contract.
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ceed on the most basic assumption that the parties expected the contract would be valid 143 and, if the law of only one of the two
jurisdictions would validate the transaction, the court should allow
44
evidence that the parties intended that state's law would apply.
This is consonant with substantive contract doctrine that favors a validating interpretation over an invalidating one. 145 All courts agree
that constructions upholding validity are in general preferred over
ones that invalidate; similar traditional contract doctrines do more to
dictate a sound "choice of law" decision here than does the choiceinfluencing methodology. This eventually should suggest that the
methodology essentially is devoid of helpful conceptual content for
most contract choice of law issues.
Contract performance choice of law issues are relatively few, in
part because few courts have had the opportunity to establish contract performance rules peculiar to their own jurisdictions. Questions
regarding remedies for breach of contract ought to be similarly difficult to raise, again because there is a near unanimity on what the
rules are. With a few exceptions, the disputes in contract cases are
not over what the rules are, but how the rules apply to the facts.
These exceptions are contract formation issues (such as capacity to
contract), statute of frauds issues, and subject-matter illegality questions. Here there can be contract disputes that raise choice of law
issues. 146
When a court faces a contract formation problem, it should base
its decision on substantive contract grounds, including considerations
of public policy, just as if the parties had expressly provided that the
law of a validating jurisdiction would govern the contract. If the
court would enforce such an express provision, it should choose the
validating law even when there is no such express provision. And the
reasons should be the same in either case-substantive contract
doctrine.
For example, suppose A and B enter a contract in which a clause
provides that all issues of formation, interpretation, and performance
143. See generally, R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 354-55 & 372-73. See also A.
note 24, at 458-65.
144. This is the "rule of validation" or "presumption of validation." See A.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 24, at 458, 65. See also Pritchard v. Norton, 108 U.S. 124
(1982); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Teas v. Kimball, 257 F.2d
817 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Knippel's Estate, 7 Wis. 2d 335, 96 N.W.2d 514 (1954).
145. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 546 n.9 (Supp. 1971).
146. As an example, the classic contract choice of law case involved the capacity
of a married woman to contract. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). See
generally B. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), reprinted rh B. CURRIE, supra note 14.
EHRENZWEIG, supra
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shall be governed by the law of Oregon, but there is no choice of
forum clause. Further suppose that A sues B in New York and that
there is a parol evidence issue. If the New York court enforces this
express provision for Oregon law, it will employ Oregon's wide-open,
all-the-circumstances approach to the parol evidence issues.147 If the
court does not enforce the law-selection clause, it will employ its own
more restrictive approach to the parol evidence issues.' 48 On either of
these resolutions, the court must resolve an issue of basic substantive
contract law, not a choice of law issue. The effect of that determination will be to foreclose a choice of law issue.
When the parties have not made an express provision for the law
that is to apply to this contract, the court still only appears to face a
choice of law issue. That appearance is a function of how choice of
law issues arise and of certain assumptions that are built into the
place focus of the lex loci rules. If A wants the New York court to use
Oregon's approach to contract, A will have to suggest reasons for
bringing the possibility of applying Oregon law into the picture. Historically, parties have done this by pointing to geographical or "place
factors" that connect the parties or the contract or the litigation with
different jurisdictions. That, historically, has been the function of
place factors-to raise the choice of law issue. 149 Under the lex loci
system, the issue then would be resolved on the basis of those factors,
but that clearly always was a second and independent use of the place
factors. If A tells the court that, although A and B negotiated and
signed the contract in New York, both A and B were Oregon businesspersons, should the court apply Oregon's parol evidence rule or
should the court insist on using New York's rule?
If the New York court would not have applied Oregon law had
there been an express law-selection clause, it should not apply Oregon
law to the lawsuit absent such a provision. If the court would have
enforced the express provision for Oregon law, the court should make
a factual inquiry about expectations when there is no such provision.
Contracts courts are intention-enforcing and expectation-protecting
courts' 50 All the "place of making the contract"rule ever did was to
147. See Hatley v. Stafford, 284 Ore. 523, 588 P.2d 603 (1978).
148. See Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928). For purposes of
this hypothetical, the difference between the approaches of Oregon and New York to
parol evidence problems is exaggerated.
149. For example, in determining whether there is a consitutional impediment
to a particular choice of law, the Supreme Court has directed that there be an examination of the relevant contacts between the state whose law has been chosen and the
facts underlying the litigation. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308
(1981) (plurality opinion); id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
150. To say that courts are "intention-enforcing" in the context of an interpre-
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allow courts to shortcircuit the intention-expectation inquiry. That
rule had the assumption built into it that the parties expected the law
of the place of contracting to govern their contract. But that assumption is a special version of the basic theory of contract that parties
expect that their contracts are valid and that their contractual intentions will be given effect in the event of litigation. The problem with
the lex loci contractus rule is that the shortcircuit it provides sometimes
results in the frustration of the parties' most basic contractual expectations and thus frustrates a policy central to the law of contract.' 5 '
Similarly, then, suppose the buyer is seventeen years old and has
a voidable capacity to contract in jurisdiction X, but cannot avoid for
lack of capacity in jurisdiction Y. Further suppose the seller's contract expressly provides that the law of jurisdiction Y applies to issues
of capacity. If an X court would not enforce the express provision,
then it will allow the buyer to avoid the contract under X-law and
should reach this result even absent the express provision. If the court
would enforce an express provision, then even absent such a provision, and assuming the existence of jurisdiction contacts sufficient to
52
raise a choice of law question, the court should still apply Y-law.
Moreover, all these issues should be resolved without reference to
where the parties entered the contract or where the parties reside.
The ratio decidendi should be substantive contract doctrine: If an Xcourt will not say an X-buyer under 17 has capacity to agree in X to a
law-selection clause of Y-law, then the fact that X-buyer entered the
contract in Y is irrelevant. Conversely, that the buyer is from Y but
entered the contract in X is irrelevant. The only hard case for an Xcourt is that of a contract executed in Y when buyer was from Y, but
tation issue may be different from saying that in the context of a formation issue.
Theories of intention involve questions of the role of the parties' intentions and the
methods by which those intentions might be proved; these will differ when the context of the dispute changes. See Morrison, limply What You Infer Unless You are a Court,
35 OKLA. L. REV. 707 (1982). In "interpreting" a contract-discerning its meaning
and terms-a court can only rely on inferences from the parties' acts and words;
when that process is insufficient in divining the "true intent," a court may have to
throw up its hands and "remake" the contract. See Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach &
Sons, 124 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1941); Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E

889 (1921).

151. This concern has led many courts to abandon the old rules in favor of more
modem rules. One approach is the "center of gravity" test adopted by New York.
See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961);
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). Another is the "most significant relationship" approach. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d
577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 188.
152. See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931). In Cerli,
Judge Learned Hand stated that it is the law which imposes obligations; the parties
are not free to decide what the law is by substituting "the law of another place." Id.
at 117.
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has moved to X by the time of litigation. Irrespective of why buyer
moved, however, the court should ask itself whether here it would
enforce a Y-selection clause and, if it would, it should apply Y-law
even in the absence of such a clause.
The point is that rather than treating these issues as if they were
choice of law issues, the court should treat them as contract issues.
This may be easier to say than to do, but the aim of choice of law is to
give effect to the policies of the underlying substantive law. The
choice-influencing-considerations methodology seems to offer no better promise in this regard, however, than any of the other rules or
analytic methods, for, in their welter of details, those approaches all
lose sight of the essential and central role which substantive policies
play in choice of law.
VI.

HAGUE V ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO.

Hague v. Allstate Insurance Co.' 53 presents difficulties for a rational
reconstruction of Minnesota's cases. If Hague states Minnesota's tort
policy, then Minnesota's tort choice of law rule is not the one previously suggested, namely, "choose the law that favors liability, but not
the law that enlarges recovery."' 54 Rather, Minnesota's tort policy is
one of the fullest compensation, and its tort choice of law rule should
55
be a fullest compensation rule.
One apparently easy solution to the difficulties Hague presents is
to say the tort choice of law rule is fullest compensation for personal
injury, but more limited compensation for other injuries. This would
allow Minnesota to put the guest statute, 56 survival of cause of ac153. 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979), aj'd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Hague involved
the question of whether Minnesota law (allowing the "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage) or Wisconsin law (arguably forbidding it) should be applied in a suit
against an insurer arising from an accident occurring in Wisconsin between Wisconsin residents, but when the beneficiary subsequently moved to Minnesota and filed
suit there. Id. at 44-45.
154. See notes 79-94 and accompanying text supra.
155. The issue in Hague was not whether the insured could recover at all, but
rather concerned the extent of the insurer's coverage. 289 N.W.2d at 45. As an example of the court's indication of a "fullest" compensation policy in tort, the court in
Hague noted that "Minnesota has an interest in maximizing the tort recovery of
plaintiffs who are involved in accidents with uninsured motorists." Id. at 47. Further, the court noted that "[t]he stated governmental interest is grounded in a policy
of compensating injured plaintiffs to the maximum extent of their injuries even
where the recovery is greater than minimum requirements." d. In contrast, the
court stated that Wisconsin had a policy "of insuring mthimum recovery on the part of
victims of uninsured motorists." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Nelson v. Employ-

ers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 670 (1972)).
156. See note 60 supra.
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tion, 157 family immunity, 158 and dramshop1 59 cases together with
Hague, but still distinguish future cases concerning punitive damages, 160 conversion, 16 1 and fraud. 16 2 The only two problems with this
solution are the hypothetical sovereign immunity case and its probable result 16 3 and a recent no-fault insurance case which did involve
personal injury but in which the court was content with a minimum
recovery.' 64 These problems do not seem surmountable and therefore
reconstruction along these lines probably would break down
eventually.
One deceptively easy solution is to say, as the Hague court did,
that "contracts of insurance on motor vehicles are in a class by themselves and must be so treated .... 165 That is, we could say the
insurance contract in Hague raised a choice of law issue that was
neither a contract issue nor a tort issue. Hence, Hague would not have
to fit the tort choice of law cases, but at a minimum it would need to
fit other Minnesota non-choice of law "stacking" cases. And Hague
66
does fit Minnesota's other stacking cases.'
This solution, however, should make us feel uneasy. For it is altogether too much like the old "characterization" problems.1 67 The
157. See notes 60-76 and accompanying text supra.
158. See note 60 supra.
159. See note 57 supra.
160. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
164. Rademacher v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 330 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1983).
In Rademacher, the court held that a nun, struck by a car while a pedestrian, was not
an "insured" within the meaning of the state no-fault insurance act and was not
entitled to recover on any of the convent's 53 motor vehicle insurance policies. Id. at
862-63. The trial court had not only found her to be covered, but additionally allowed her to "stack" all the policies. Id. at 861. Because the supreme court found the
plaintiff not to be an "insured," it did not reach the issue of her right to "stack" the
policies. id. at 863. The plaintiff in Rademacher had settled her claims against the
driver and owner of the car that hit her for $75,000. Id. at 859. The Minnesota NoFault Automobile Insurance Act was designed to ensure that no injured person
would fall through its "safety net" and provides coverage for a pedestrian who does
not even own a car. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.46(1) (1982). However, an additional
purpose of the Act is to prevent over-compensation and duplicative recovery; because
the plaintiff in Rademacher had recovered some money, there was little pressure for the
Minnesota court to maximize that recovery. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(2) (1982).
165. Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 50.
166. See, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207
N.W.2d 348 (1973) (allowing injured insured to stack uninsured motorist coverage
for several automobiles on the ground that such a rule better affords the insured the
coverage for which he paid).
167. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra. To the extent that choice of
law rules depend upon the characterization of the action, manipulation will always
be possible. However, such manipulation should be remote when the conflicts meth-
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court in effect bootstrapped Hague out of contract into tort in order to
use tort choice of law contacts and to use tort policies in analyzing the
forum governmental interest consideration. 168 To say that this did
not make Hague fully a tort choice of law case is to ignore that insurance forms part of the background of a very large number of tort
issues.
There is nothing objectionable about treating tort indemnity insurance contracts consistently with straightforward tort cases. Indeed, this may be preferable, insofar as loss-spreading is central to the
law of tort, 169 and insurance is a rational and common method of
coping with loss by private loss-spreading. Further, courts should encourage the practice of insuring against tort losses. But then courts
should also give due regard to the contractual aspects of this practice:
the planned allocation of risks between the insurer and the insured.
On this point, the Minnesota Supreme Court fell far short of being
evenhanded when it said, "[t]he fact that one cannot predict automobile accidents because they are unplanned makes [the consideration
of] predictability of results less important in automobile liability in170
surance cases than in other contract cases."
That is not fair; insurance is planni'ngfor the unplanned, thereby

shifting risks of loss from the insured to the insurer. But the difference
between a commercial contract and an insurance contract is not a
difference of risk-shifting. Each shifts risks. A contract shifts risks to
the promisor in exchange for consideration from the promisee, 1 7 , and
those risks stay with the promisor absent some statute that reshifts the
risk to the promisee1 72 or some mutually agreed reshift to the
1 73
promisee.
odologies and rules are grounded in the same substantive laws and policies that
would be brought to bear in a wholly domestic case, and vice versa.
168. For example, the court noted that because the contract was "one of indemnity for tort recovery, the kinds of contacts relevant to tort cases may be considered."
Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 47.
169. For example, among the traditional interests advanced in tort cases for
favoring the state of the place of injury are an interest in keeping tort victims off the
local welfare rolls (and thus spreading the loss among the taxpayers) and an interest
in ensuring payment to local medical providers (who otherwise would spread the loss
among other users of medical services). See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 287-89.
For a discussion of this in the context of the interests of the forum state, see notes 5460 and accompanying text supra.
170. Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 48.
171. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 3-4 & 10 (1960 & Supp. 1980).
172. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-510 (1976) (re-shifting risk of
loss to seller where delivered goods non-conforming).
173. This usually appears in contract in a form known as "allocation of risks
between the parties;" but conceptually what has happened is that the risks are put on
the promisor upon entering thecontract and then shifted away, perhaps in exchange
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Nor is the difference between commercial contracts and insurance contracts one of planning or one of unplanned events. Of
course, the average auto accident is unplanned; so is the average crop
failure or war or fire or loss-during-transit. Contracts enable people
to planfor the unplanned, and in this regard insurance contracts are
exactly like commercial contracts. Insurance contracts differ from
commercial contracts in that commercial contracts generally concern
goods, land, or services, but include considerations of risks and riskshifting. Insurance contracts, on the other hand, exclusively concern
risks and risk-shifting. Auto insurance contracts shift risks associated
with autos; home fire insurance contracts shift particular risks associated with owning a home; health insurance contracts shift the risks
associated with being a biological entity subject to disease and injury;
and so forth. They are nonetheless contracts, the purpose of which is
to shift a risk from the premium-paying insured to the premium-collecting insurance company.
But the central difference between an ordinary commercial contract and an automobile accident insurance contract is that legislatures and courts have particular policy interests in the latter which
they do not have in the former-tort policy interests.1 74 Accident
insurance contracts are contracts about torts: tort liability, tort injury, tort loss-even when the coverage is on a no-fault basis. The
Minnesota Supreme Court seems to believe that an insurance contract must be a contract for torts in order to be treated as a contract
for choice of law purposes. This approach shows the court does not
know what a contract is.
Nonetheless, automobile insurance contracts are special. The
court attributes the "peculiar hybrid nature of the problems involved
in automobile liability insurance cases" 1 75 to their being contracts
about tort risks, hence "both tort and contract considerations"'' 76
should determine a choice of law issue involving the stacking of uninsured motorist policies. 177 In this sense, Hague does appear to create a
class of its own and, thus, would not affect the two-fold tort choice of
law rule suggested. 17 The problem is that the court's stated reasons
for the promisor's taking on certain other risks that never would otherwise have fallen
on him.
174. See Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 47-48.
175. Id.at 48.
176. Id.
177. The insured in Hague had only one overall auto insurance policy but it
included three sub-policies of uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 45.
178. For a discussion of the two-fold tort policy analysis, see notes 77-94 and
accompanying text supra.
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in Hague for choosing Minnesota law were exactly because it gave greater

compensation than Wisconsin law, 179 suggesting that Minnesota has
a "fullest compensation" policy in tort. That simply is not true. 180
The court should have stuck to contract analysis and interpretation. 8" Because the insurance company collected three uninsuredmotorist coverage premiums, all three policies should have been triggered by one uninsured motorist accident. Otherwise, the insurance
company received something for nothing. Although uninsured-motorist coverage may be funded on a per car basis, there is no similar
way to calculate the risks. The coverage follows the person. An insured who has two cars and two policies will contribute twice to the
insurance company's funds out of which to pay uninsured-motorist
recoveries. If the insured is not allowed to stack here, the insurance
company collects premiums for which it incurs no obligation.182
Traditional contract doctrines and rules about consideration and
interpretation are designed to prevent this something-for-nothing result. All the Minnesota Supreme Court had to do was scrutinize the
no stacking clause in the same way as an "other insurance" clause,
and then explain why it would not enforce a no stacking clause in a
Minnesota contract. 18 3 That Wisconsin might have different theories
about contract should be irrelevant; if Minnesota can rest its view on
179. The court noted, in analyzing the problem under the "better law" prong of
its analysis, that "[w]e believe that it is preferable to compensate victims of accidents
to the full extent of their injuries." Id. at 49. Moreover, in analyzing the relative
governmental interests of Minnesota and Wisconsin, the court noted that "[t]he advancement of Minnesota's interest [in fully compensating the plaintiff] is only partially inconsistent with the advancement of Wisconsin's in that Wisconsin is
interested in giving the plaintiff some recovery but at minimum limits." Id.
180. See notes 77-94 and accompanying text supra.
181. The Minnesota Court did undertake some contract analysis in order to
determine whether a conflict existed. The court presented the issue in the case as one
involving the construction of the insurance policy's "excess insurance clause" prohibiting stacking, and assumed that Wisconsin would enforce such a clause. 289 N.W.2d
at 48 (citing Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670
(1974)). But see Weintraub, Who's Afraid of ConstitutionalLimit'ations on Chotce of Law,

10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 20-23 (1981). Professor Weintraub has argued that the
conflict in Hague was a false one in that Wisconsin would have reached the same
result as Minnesota by invalidating the "excess insurance" clause. Id. The proper
result in Hague was that the plaintiff should have been allowed to stack the policies
and no one should care whether the result stems from Wisconsin or Minnesota law.
182. See American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Sarvela, 327 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn.
1982); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
See also Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141 (1980).
183. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 307 (noting that most courts will not enforce "other insurance" clauses that will eliminate a proportionate share of liability
even if the insured is unable to collect on his other insurance).
On the other hand, "excess insurance" clauses are much more likely to be upheld where the policy provides that the insurer will provide coverage only after the
insured has exhausted his other insurance; for then, the insurer has accepted only a
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solid contract analysis, Wisconsin's possible inability to handle contract law or its different theory of contract doctrine would be no
184
bar.
Of course, one of the substantial problems with Hague is that it
involves insurance. Courts-and the rest of us-have trouble understanding the insurance industry, insurance contracts, and regulations
concerning insurance. In the rehearing opinion, the court did come
to the nub of the matter, however. The court essentially said it was
treating the insurance company and the insurance contract as if all
the litigational contacts were with Minnesota. The court justified its
approach by reminding the insurance company that two of the foreseeable risks the company took were that litigation over this contract
would arise in a state other than Wisconsin and that the foreign state
would allow the policies to be stacked. 85 The result is that the court
treated the case as if there were no choice of law issue presented, but
only contract interpretation issues. That is, the Hague court ultirisk that the insured will incur losses greater than existing coverage. See, e.g. , Citizens
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959).
184. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has described uninsured motorist coverage
as "backstop or last resort" coverage. Drake v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d
977, 982, 236 N.W.2d 204, 207 (1975) (citing Leatherman v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 651, 190 N.W.2d 904, 907 (1971)). Additionally, Wisconsin
insists, in interpreting uninsured motorist policies, that the insurance contract meet
at least the statutorily mandated minimum level of coverage. See Siegel v. American
Interstate Ins. Corp., 72 Wis. 2d 522, 241 N.W.2d 178 (1976).
Despite the Minnesota court's unqualified statement that Wisconsin would enforce an "excess insurance" clause prohibiting suit against the insurer when other
coverage is available, Wisconsin case law indicates that Wisconsin will enforce such a
clause only when the other available insurance exceeds the required minimum coverage. See Drake, 70 Wis. 2d at 982, 236 N.W.2d at 207. Thus, the Hague court's statement that it is Wisconsin's policy to minimize such recovery is questionable. More
correctly, Wisconsin's policy seems to be one that ensures at least the minimum recovery. In Hague, there was no other available insurer from whom the plaintiff could
recover. See Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 45. The precise issue in Hague, whether an insured
may "stack" three policies providing uninsured motorist coverage in an action
against the only available insurer, has never been faced by the Wisconsin court.
Indeed, a recent Minnesota decision seems to indicate a policy similar to that of
Wisconsin when the issue is one of stacking sources of recovery rather than policies
from the same source. See Rademacher v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 330 N.W.2d 858
(Minn. 1983). For a discussion of Rademacher, see note 164 supra. Moreover, in another recent decision, the Minnesota court ruled that an insured could not reap the
benefits of a statutory increase of uninsured motorist coverage minimum benefits
under a policy issued prior to the statutory change. Owens v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co., 328 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 1983). In Owens, the court noted
that "[t]here is no suggestion in the record . . . that a higher premium was required
of or paid by [the insured] .

. .

. It does not seem fair to us to permit [the insured] to

benefit from an increased coverage which he had not expected and for which he had
not paid." Id. at 164-65. One would hope that the Minnesota court and all other
courts used such substantive law analysis in choice of law decisions as well.
185. Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 50 (opinion on rehearing).
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mately dealt with the substantive law itself-contract law, or insurance contract law-instead of getting lost in a web of choice of law
"methodologies."

VII.

FORUM SHOPPING

If courts decide which law to apply on the basis of an analysis of
the substantive law itself, rather than on the basis of the old or new
choice of law rules or methods, will this lead to forum shopping? One
of the pervasive concerns in choice of law has been whether applying
the law sought by a forum-shopping plaintiff will defeat the expectations of the defendant or will upset the policies of the state in which
the defendant acted (or from which the defendant hails). As Justice
Stevens pointed out in Hague, the latter concern stems from our desire
for interstate harmony and national unity.' 8 6 Today, these forum
shopping concerns can appear even greater because the constitutional
limitations on choice of law are so lax.18 7 But, primarily because the
constitutional limitations on jurisdiction are so high,' 88 the approach
I have suggested in this article generally will not lead to any form of
forum shopping that should concern us. 189
When the plaintiff sues at home, there is no reason to be concerned about forum shopping because there is nothing suspicious
about the plaintiffs choice of forum. 19° We expect plaintiffs to avail
themselves of the economies of time, money, and convenience that
suits at home afford. We particularly expect this when the plaintiff is
injured in his or her home state.
When the plaintiff forgoes the economies afforded by bringing
suit at home, however, we may begin to be suspicious about whether
the plaintiff has sued elsewhere primarily in order to obtain the application of a particular law and thus whether the plaintiff has attempted to "buy" a particular result. Yet, there are other more
"legitimate" reasons for plaintiffs to sue elsewhere than at home, most
notably to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. This jurisdiction in
turn usually should keep courts from wondering too deeply about
186. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
187. Id.
188. Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Schaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) ("all assertions of" jurisdiction require fair play
and substantial justice).
189. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently has noted the legitimacy of forum
shopping. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
190. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (plaintiff has
freedom of choice of forum). But see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)
(forum must have jurisdiction over defendant).
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whether the plaintiff is a forum shopper because the jurisdictional
prerequisites will mitigate the dangers we usually fear will result from
forum shopping.
The court will have to have either general or specific jurisdiction
over the defendant.' 9' The assertion of general jurisdiction will be
permissible only if the defendant is a resident of the forum or has
major continuous connections with the forum. 192 Such a defendant's
expectations theoretically will have been framed with a view towards
the possible application of forum law to his activities; hence, the defeating-the-defendant's-expectations reason for objecting to a possible
forum-shopping plaintiff does not exist. Further, interstate harmony
is not disrupted by a forum's applying it's own law to a forum defendant. That, at a minimum, is a lesson of Hague.
The assertion of specific jurisdiction also will usually mitigate the
dangers courts traditionally have feared would result from forum
shopping. Specific jurisdiction will be based on factual contacts between the defendant and the forum and between the forum and the
litigation193-41e., the defendant will have done an act that is the
source of the claim in the forum. These jurisdictional contacts between the forum and the litigation clearly insulate interstate harmony
because the policies of the state in which the defendant acted are furthered, not upset, by applying forum law when that state is the forum. The jurisdictional contacts of the forum with the defendant
similarly obviate worries about the defendant's expectations. This
defendant will have acted in the forum purposefully, in a jurisdictional sense, and did expect or should have expected forum law to
apply.
Thus neither of the primary evils thought to result from forum
shopping exists in the usual case in which a plaintiff sues away from
home, and the court usually should not worry about whether the
191. See Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp., 652 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing general and specific jurisdiction).
192. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (neither
party was resident of forum, and subject matter of cause of action had no relation to
forum, but defendant had been carrying on in the forum "a continuous and systematic, but limited part of its general business"). See also Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1481,
(citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438).
193. Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1980). See also Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Co., 22 I11.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957) (defendant had less significant and purposeful contacts with the forum than do residents but those contacts were connected to the litigation). Cf.
Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (no jurisdiction because the defendants had only minor
connections with the forum and these were not related to the litigation).
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plaintiff chose this forum in order to obtain a particular result. But
when a court really believes that a plaintiff has shopped and that
interstate harmony would be disrupted by a choice of forum law or
that a defendant's legitimate expectations will be defeated, the court
will have the choice of departing from its normal approach to choice
of law or dismissing the suit on the grounds offorum non conveniens and
letting another state handle the suit. 19 4 Interstate harmony or defendant's expectations should not require a court to change its constitutionally sound approach to choice of law, and the court should use
theforum non conventens alternative for the rare plaintiffs the court is
convinced are shopping impermissibly.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Once we break away from the confines of geographically-focused
choice of law theories, we will see that true choice of law issues raise
the same problems the courts deal with every day. Courts must shape
the law from policy using the analytical tools available in the whole of
the law, not just a corner of conflicts theory, or a section of tort laws,
or a hectare of contract and tort law.
There is nothing impermissible about one court's reaching a
choice of law result that is different from the results other courts
might reach, as long as the result the court reaches comports with the
court's own well-developed view of the underlying substantive law.
Indeed, we should welcome a multiplicity of views about substantive
law. The only conflicts problem worth talking about in choice of law
is the conflict between a result in a case and the policies of the substantive law that give rise to the choice of law issue. That conflict is
not being addressed sufficiently by our courts because courts consistently lose sight of the substantive policies of the underlying law.
When courts focus on the law and its policies directly, however, conflicts will die, although there will remain conflicting visions of the law
from one jurisdiction to the next. But the law will thrive in an environment in which there are developed, articulate, and different visions of substantive law.
The only reason to be afraid to let courts resolve choice of law
issues on only a substantive law policy basis is that we fear the courts
will not do, or are not capable of doing, the hard work substantive
194. Moreover, assuming that the court is faced with a forum shopping plaintiff
and that the court is convinced this is a serious matter, the court should consider a
forum non conveniens dismissal even when, by the time the court comes to the issue,
there no longer is another forum in which the plaintiff can sue unless the defendant
voluntarily agrees not to raise a statute of limitations defense.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/1

52

Morrison: Death of Conflicts

1983-84]

DEATH OF CONFLICTS

365

analysis requires. All of the choice of law methodologies have attempted to protect us from unjust, slipshod courts by weaving arbitrary geographic factors into choice of law. This cure is worse than
the illness and treats only the symptoms anyway. Everyone always
has something to fear from unjust courts. No one has anything to fear
in justice justly given.
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